Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal by Cui, Wei
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2017 
Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal 
Wei Cui 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, cui@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Wei Cui, "Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal" ([forthcoming in 2017]) 67:2 UTLJ 1. 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard 
Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
1 
 
Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal 
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This Article offers the first comprehensive appraisal in both the legal and economic literatures of 
proposals for adopting destination-based cash flow taxation (DCFT) of multinational corporations. The 
DCFT was a key recommendation for reforming corporate taxation in the U.K., and has subsequently 
attracted wide attention as a way to fundamentally reform international taxation in the U.S., Europe and 
elsewhere. The core intuition of the DCFT is to tax profits earned by mobile capital by reference to 
immobile factors. I distinguish three versions of the DCFT for implementing this intuition: 1. formulary 
apportionment of business profits by reference to locations of sales to final consumers; 2. a destination-
based VAT with deduction of labor costs and full refund of losses; and 3. a destination-based VAT with 
deduction of labor costs and implemented by origin countries.  
In addition to identifying numerous controversial normative, behavioral and empirical 
assumptions that have been used to motivate and defend DCFT proposals, I present two conceptual 
dilemmas that challenge the proposals in their own terms. I argue that because the residence of individual 
shareholders and the location of final consumers are both immobile, the difference between residence- 
and destination-based taxation should be seen as lying in how likely it is to harness information about 
shareholder residence or consumer location. The fundamental challenge for DCFT proposals is that 
market mechanisms do not readily collect information about the latter, while information about 
shareholder residence is latent in the market. Therefore, most arguments made by DCFT proponents 
support residence-based taxation instead. 
 
Keywords: international taxation, corporate taxation, destination-based taxation, VAT, BEPS, residence-
based taxation. 
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The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, launched in July 2013 by the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is now well into its third year. As a high-profile 
policy initiative for combatting perceivably rampant international tax avoidance by multinationals, BEPS 
is characterized by an agenda that has immediate and substantial bearings on taxpayers and the global tax 
profession.1 Perhaps predictably from the project’s political nature (having been endorsed by the member 
governments of the G-20) and its pressing practical implications, theoretical insights on the project, 
whether positive or normative, have been short in supply. It is only in the past year or so that a small body 
of academic literature has emerged that offers evaluations of BEPS from theoretical perspectives.2 
According to one prominent strand of this academic response to BEPS, the BEPS initiative is superficial 
in that it deals only with the symptoms, but not with the causes, of the ills in the international tax system. 
What should receive more public attention are more fundamental reforms of the system.3  
                                                     
1 OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).  OECD, BEPS 2014 Deliverables, OECD 
(2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-2014-deliverables.htm.  OECD, BEPS - Frequently Asked 
Questions, OECD (2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm.   
2 See, e.g. Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review of the 
Empirical Literature, 35 FISC. STUD. 421 (2014); James R. Hines Jr, How Serious Is the Problem of Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting? 62 CAN. TAX J. 443 (2014); Ernesto Crivelli et al., Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing 
Countries (International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 15/118/May 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42973.0; Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: 
Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Policy Developments (paper presented at the 9th Annual Symposium, 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, June 23, 2015).  
3 See, e.g., Clemens Fuest et al., Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by Multinational Firms: Issues and 
Options for Reform, 5 WORLD TAX J. 307 (2013); Michael Devereux & Rita de la Feria, Designing and 
Implementing a Destination-Based Corporate Tax (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper 
No. 14/07/May, 2014), available at http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/5081/1/WP1407.pdf; Michael P. Devereux & John 
Vella, Are We Heading towards a Corporate Tax System Fit for the 21st Century? 35 FISC. STUD. 449 (2014).  
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Among writers who express this view, many make reference to the destination-based, cash-flow 
(or “flow-of-funds”) corporate tax that was prominently presented in the UK Mirrlees Review in 2010.4 
Interest in this “radical” reform option has also been expressed in policymaking circles.5 The key to the 
fascination that this reform proposal has held for both scholars and policymakers lies in the idea of 
“destination”. As will be explained below, the essential idea of destination-based corporate income or 
profit taxation6 is that corporate income or profits should be taxed in neither the countries of “source” (i.e. 
where productive activities generating the income or profits occur) nor the countries of “residence” (i.e. 
where either the corporation, its parent, or its ultimate individual owners reside), which are the only 
options traditionally discussed in the design of international taxation.  Instead, the countries where the 
sales to final consumers occur that generate such income or profits should be allowed to tax them.7 The 
prospect of injecting an entirely new dimension into the design of international taxation is what proposals 
for destination-based taxation seem to promise.  
In this Article, I offer a comprehensive and critical response—the first, to my knowledge, in both 
the economic and legal literatures—to proposals for the destination-based, cash-flow corporate tax 
(abbreviated below as “DCFT”). 8  I examine DCFT proposals and ask questions such as: What are the 
main theoretical motivations for advocating such a tax? What are its basic mechanisms? What are the 
main challenges that might face its implementation? Are the challenges merely technical (which might be 
overcome or mitigated by careful institutional design, including through legal devices), or are they more 
fundamentally conceptual? And, last but not the least, how do these challenges—whether conceptual, 
                                                     
4 Alan Auerbach et al., Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 837, 
837-93 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter ADS 2010]. The Mirrlees Review was a comprehensive review of 
tax reforms completed in the United Kingdom in 2010. For references to some literature on the destination-based 
cash flow tax that preceded ADS 2010, see Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 3 n.1. In addition, as ADS 2010 
acknowledges, there is an important body of U.S. economic and legal literature that discusses implementing 
consumption taxation through a cash-flow tax on businesses, either on a destination or an origin basis. See, e.g., 
David Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy (Griswold Centre for Economic Policy Studies, Working Paper 
93/Aug., 2003), available at https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/93bradford.pdf; Harry Grubert & T. 
Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NATL TAX J. 619 (1995). For  a 
different type of proposal to make the corporate income tax destination-based, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case 
for a Destination-Based Corporate Tax (University of Michigan Law School Draft Paper/Jul. 22, 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2634391. Some further U.S. literature is cited and discussed in 
Part III.2 infra.   
5 See, e.g. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 42 (2014). 
6 The difference between taxing corporate income and taxing corporate profit is that the normal return to corporate 
capital is taxed under the former but not the latter. Both tax the “excess” or “supra-normal” return to corporate 
capital, sometimes also labeled as “corporate rent”. See discussion in Part I infra. 
7 As one critic of destination-based income taxation puts it: “Sales-based income taxation is a new guiding principle 
for the taxation of cross-border income. Other standards that have been suggested…offer the choice between source 
taxation and residence taxation. Where consumption takes place has not usually been explicitly considered.… There 
therefore seem to be three [, not two,] basic choices for who should tax corporate profits: the MNC’s home country 
[i.e. the residence country], the country where the good or service is produced [i.e. the source country], and the 
country where it is consumed [i.e. the country of destination].” Harry Grubert, Destination Based Income Taxes: A 
Mismatch Made in Heaven? (Manuscript on file with the author) [hereinafter A Mismatch Made in Heaven][Pincites 
to Grubert’s article pending definitive version] 
8 There is currently no standard abbreviation for this proposed reform option. See, e.g. Kristen Parillo, A 
Destination-Based Corporate Tax: An Alternative to BEPS? 78 TAX NOTES INTL 315 (2015) (using the abbreviation 
“DBCT”). I choose DCFT to emphasize the cash-flow aspect of the proposals. 
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technical, administrative, or political—compare with the constraints that might have led to all the flaws in 
the existing international tax system?    
The basic conclusion I come to is that the concept of “destination” does not introduce superior 
possibilities for taxing corporate profit (or income). The key theoretical ideas behind my arguments are as 
follows. Implicitly, DCFT proponents reject taxing multinationals by reference to the residence of their 
ultimate individual shareholders. Instead, they aim to introduce information about individuals qua final 
consumers into the design of the corporate tax, and look to VAT mechanisms for clues about how this can 
be done. However, individual residency and the location of individuals as consumers are—and are 
assumed by DCFT proponents to be—essentially the same. Why, then, can corporate income or profit be 
taxed by reference to the location of final consumers, but not by reference to the location of ultimate 
shareholders? In reality, market transactions are much less likely to transmit information about final 
consumers than they are to transmit information about ultimate shareholders. This is because the identities 
of parties transacting in the marketplace tend to be preserved only for financial transactions, but not for 
most other transactions such as the sales of goods and services. Thus from a system-design perspective, 
“destination” is much less promising than “residence” (when both are understood as capturing 
information about natural persons) for dealing with problems arising from capital mobility. 
I develop the above ideas through a series of arguments directed at three different versions of the 
DCFT. The first version, discussed in Part II below, proposes to tax corporate profits (measured on a 
cash-flow basis) essentially by sales-factor apportionment.9 Although this is not the most favored version 
of the DCFT, it is important to discuss for three reasons. First, the proposal faces a detrimental dilemma 
arising from the fact that much of international trade comprises sales not to final consumers but to other 
businesses.  Reviewing this dilemma helps to highlight the difficulty of introducing information about 
final consumers into international taxation. Second, some commentators have surmised that taxation on 
the destination basis may be inherently more suitable for consumption taxes than for income taxes.10 A 
careful consideration of DCFT Version 1 suggests that, to the contrary, the main objections that can be 
mounted against it are also objections against destination-based income taxes. Third, despite its flaws, 
DCFT Version 1 is clearly a tax on corporate profits, and therefore is immune to a crucial objection to the 
other versions of the CDFT.11 
The second version of the DCFT, discussed in Part III, is likely the most favored version among 
DCFT proponents.12 It is similar to a destination-based value added tax (VAT) but with two differences: 
(1) labor cost is fully deductible, and (2) businesses’ cash-flow losses (including from the full expensing 
of corporate investments) are fully refunded.13  I argue that this version of the DCFT faces a different 
                                                     
9 It is thus analogous to recent proposals for taxing corporate income by formulary apportionment. See, e.g. Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah et al., Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 
FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
10 A Mismatch Made in Heaven, supra note 7, at __. 
11 See discussion in Part III.4 infra.  
12 DCFT Version 2 is most fully developed in Alan Auerbach & Michael Devereux, Consumption and Cash-Flow 
Taxes in an International Setting 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 19579/Oct. 2013), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19579 [hereinafter AD 2013]. See also ADS 2010, supra note 4; Devereux 
& de la Feria, supra note 3. 




dilemma: either it creates unpalatable trade distortions (and therefore is properly challengeable under 
WTO law), or, if assumptions (relating to the incidence of the DCFT) are made that such trade distortions 
do not arise, it simply fails to impose a tax on corporate profits in the normally understood sense. 
Moreover, it allocates tax revenue according to where shareholders reside and not where customers reside. 
This, I believe, substantially detract from the conceptual and policy appeal of DCFT.  
A third version of the DCFT, discussed in Part IV, is similar to Version 2 but requires both 
administrative cooperation and revenue transfers among different nations.14 It faces a similar dilemma as 
Version 2, but also raises further questions about what assumptions are appropriate, regarding how much 
countries cooperate in implementing international tax policy, in comparing DCFT proposals and the 
current international tax system (and less radical reform proposals. It can be argued that at the level of 
cooperation assumed by DCFT Version 3, the current international tax regime is preferable to the DCFT.  
These specific arguments concerning three distinct versions of the DCFT all suggest that the 
challenges of taxing corporate profits on a destination-basis are fundamentally conceptual. The Article 
claims that these challenges can be traced to the difficulty of incorporating information about destination 
into international tax design, a difficulty that clearly goes to the very heart of DCFT proposals. I argue 
that this difficulty holds equally for the VAT and for the DCFT, as is reflected in the fact that the VAT, 
contrary to the suggestions of several scholars, relies very little on information about final consumers in 
its application to cross-border transactions. By contrast, the international income tax systems in many 
countries successfully deploy at least some information about the ultimate shareholders of corporations 
(and the corporate holdings of individual investors). Interestingly, these abstract considerations point to a 
novel international tax reform option, namely formulary apportionment by reference to the residence of 
ultimate individual shareholders. Although this option has rarely been given consideration, and although 
elaborating it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is an obvious and inevitable implication of the 
arguments advanced here.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the theoretical motivations for DCFT proposals, 
identifies certain weaknesses in the normative framework adopted by DCFT proponents, and considers 
how a DCFT is related to individual taxation. Parts II-IV analyze and criticize the three versions of the 
DCFT. Part V elaborates on the fundamental difficulty of introducing information about final 
consumption into the design of international taxation, by showing how the VAT relies very little on 
information about the location of final consumers. Part VI lays out a fundamental explanation of this 
phenomenon in terms of the differences between financial and non-financial transactions in respect of 
their tendency to retain information about mutual identities of transacting parties. It then explains why 
formulary apportionment by residence of ultimate shareholders should be further considered for 
reforming international corporate taxation. A brief Conclusion follows.  
I. The Normative Framework and Scope of Application of DCFT Proposals  
1. Neutralities in the face of capital mobility: the basic set-up 
 
                                                     
14 This version of the DCFT is set out in Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3. 
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The destination-based, cash-flow tax is intended to replace the income tax many countries 
currently impose on corporations. The idea of a cash flow tax on business entities is well-known, and 
dates back to at least the U.K.’s Meade Report in the late 1970s.15 A cash flow tax allows a business’ 
capital investments to be immediately deducted (as opposed to depreciated overtime) in computing its tax 
base. This results in a zero marginal tax rate on the business’ investment, and eliminates the tax distortion 
on its marginal investment decisions.16  
While various reasons have historically been offered for imposing a zero rate of tax on the normal 
return to capital,17 the recent literature on corporate taxation has emphasized one such reason arising in 
the international context. When investors have access to a global financial market, any business in a small 
open economy can raise capital only at a price determined by the world market. Under this assumption, 
any tax imposed by the government of the small open economy on the normal return to investment will 
simply increase, by the amount of the tax, the required rate of return for investments in the country. This 
has two effects: it creates deadweight losses by reducing the level of demand for capital; and, because 
perfectly mobile capital bears no burden of the tax, any tax collected is simply shifted onto local 
immobile factors of production such as labor. Eliminating the tax would remove the deadweight loss 
without affecting the government’s ability to tax local immobile factors.18  
The motivation for the “destination-based” aspect of the DCFT relies on the following further 
reasoning.19 Multinational corporations (MNCs) actually face three, not one, margins in their investment 
decisions. They first make discrete decisions on where to locate production. While many factors affect 
this decision, the relevant tax factor is the effective average rate of tax that would be borne by the returns 
from an investment as a whole.20 Once the discrete decision of where to locate production is made, a 
second type of decision, how much to invest, will be made and will continue to be adjusted. This type of 
decision is affected by the effective marginal tax rate. Third and finally, once profits on investments are 
realized, corporate managers have choices about where to book the profits, and this last decision will be 
affected by the countries’ statutory tax rates. 
                                                     
15 JAMES MEADE, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978), available at 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/3433. 
16 In the recent policy literature, the cash-flow corporate tax is usually presented alongside two close alternatives: a 
modification of the current corporate income tax that provides an “allowance for corporate equity” (ACE), and 
another modification that involves a “capital cost allowance”. Despite several technical differences, all three 
alternatives propose a tax on corporate rent instead of corporate income: the normal return to capital earned by 
corporate investments is exempted, and only supra-normal returns to investment are taxed. See Robin Boadway & 
Jean-François Tremblay, Corporate Tax Reform: Issues and Prospects for Canada (Mowat Centre Research Paper 
No. 88/May 7, 2014), available at http://mowatcentre.ca/corporate-tax-reform. 
17 See, generally, James Banks & Peter Diamond, The base for direct taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE 
MIRRLEES REVIEW 548 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010). 
18 See ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 842;  Roger H.Gordon & James R. Hines, Jr., International Taxation, in 4 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (ALAN AUERBACH & MARTIN FELDSTEIN EDS., 2002). 
19 Id. at 838.  
20 This average rate will depend on the effective tax rate on marginal investment (which may be positive, zero, or 
negative), the tax rates on infra-marginal investments, and the proportions of the returns subject to each of the rates. 
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To illustrate the choices of MNCs along these three margins, consider the following stylized set-
up,21 which involves three countries that play different roles in the international tax regime. First, there is 
country O, in which a multinational locates its production, say through a company X incorporated in O. O 
is often labeled the country of “source” for X’s income or profits. It can also be labeled the country of 
“origin”, in light of the possibility that the goods produced in it may be exported for sale in another 
country. Second, there is a country of “residence”, R, which is where X’s ultimate individual 
shareholders—the ultimate claimants to X’s income—reside.22 R may also happen to be the country 
where X’s ultimate corporate parent is incorporated or managed, but because the place of incorporation or 
management is increasingly mobile and tax-driven,23 it is the residence country (or countries) of 
shareholders that is (are) more relevant. Third, there is a tax haven country, H, with substantially lower 
statutory and effective tax rates than both R and O (e.g. the tax rate may be zero).  
DCFT proponents point out that if the shareholders of X have already decided to locate X in O, 
and if O eliminates its tax on the normal return to corporate capital (e.g. by adopting a cash flow tax or 
one of its close relatives), tax factors will no longer affect X’s marginal decision about how much to 
invest in O. However, tax can still distort choices on the first and third margins. Thus, for example, if the 
MNC group to which X belongs can command some kind of firm-specific, mobile rent, it may choose to 
locate production in a jurisdiction (e.g. H) with a lower average tax rate in order to maximize after-tax 
rent, even if in another country (e.g. O), with a higher average tax rate, a higher pre-tax rent can be 
generated for the firm.24 Therefore even a cash flow tax can still distort real economic activities and lead 
to welfare loss, as long as it is “source”-based. Moreover, X may be tempted to shift income resulting 
from production in O to H, in order to lower the tax on its profits. 
These distortions, DCFT proponents suggest, can be removed if one implements the taxation of 
X’s cash-flow profits by reference to a factor that X cannot manipulate. Moreover, they claim that one 
such factor is where the final consumers for the goods X produces reside. Most productive activities 
eventually end in the sale of consumable goods and services. The location of final consumers, though, is 
essentially a given for any MNC. Thus if corporate profits are taxed by reference to where the sales to 
final consumers generating the profits are made,25 the MNC’s decisions about where to locate its 
production and its profits will have no effect on its tax liability. The MNC should then make these 
decisions based only on real (i.e. non-tax-driven) economic considerations. A DCFT would consequently 
be superior to source-based (either income or cash-flow) taxation, in that it achieves neutrality along all 
three decisional margins described above and avoids distortionary effects. In terms of the stylized setup 
described above, DCFT proposals introduce a fourth country, the country of “destination” (D in Figure 
                                                     
21 See ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 870. ADS 2010 does not explicitly discuss the tax haven country, and considers 
only the residence, source/origin, and destination countries. See Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework  (University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics 
Research Paper No. 703/Sept. 25, 2014), for a setup explicitly including a tax haven country.  
22 There may be indefinitely many interposed entities, located in other jurisdictions, between X and its ultimate 
individual shareholders. 
23 Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 1271 (2009); Daniel Shaviro, The Rising 
Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377 (2011). 
24 It is commonly agreed that if a certain rent is location-specific or immobile, it is more likely that a tax imposed by 
the government where the rent is located would not affect the decisions of foreign investors. See ADS 2010, at 872.   
25 As this formulation already reveals, what “sales to final consumers generating the profits” means for firms that 
only sell intermediate inputs to other firms is ambiguous. See Part II infra. 
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1)—the country where X’ products are bought and consumed—into the picture. Under the current 
international tax system, only countries O, R, and H are regarded as have taxing rights over X’s income. 
But DCFT proponents argue that many of the intractable problems of the current system can be solved if 





This Article focuses on the central question of what it means to introduce D into the taxation of 
X’s profits, taking largely as given the normative framework just described. However, it is important to 
mention at the outset a number of questions and objections that can be (and have been) raised against the 
foregoing normative framework itself. Some of these questions have specific design implications for 
DCFT proposals, e.g. whether the DCFT should apply to flow-through entities. However, discussing 
these questions and objections may be perceived by DCFT proponents as not engaging with their 
proposals on their own terms. This Article aims precisely to pursue this latter kind of engagement. 
Therefore, after discussing some of the important objections to the DCFT’s normative framework in this 
Part, I will leave them aside, and focus on the central theoretical intuition that the country of destination 
expands the set of policy options for designing international taxation. 
2. Do neutralities provide a necessary or sufficient set of normative criteria? 
 
A first type of objection concerns the significance of the criteria of neutrality in light of which the 
DCFT is presented as potentially superior to residence- or source-based income taxation. Consider, to 
start, neutrality with respect to where to book corporate profits—the third margin described above. Are 
real economic activities associated with decisions along this margin (assuming such decisions to be 
influenced by statutory tax rates)? On one hand, if the main activities associated with such decisions are 
the implementation of tax planning and avoidance strategies, then it can be agreed that these activities are 
Country H Country R 
Country D 















a form of social deadweight loss, the elimination of which is desirable.26 There are, however, other policy 
instruments for responding to tax planning and avoidance, such as anti-avoidance rules adopted either on 
a unilateral or a multi-lateral basis.27 It is not clear that fundamental changes to the tax base and the 
allocation of taxing rights—which is what DCFT proposals require—are necessary. On the other hand, if, 
putting wasteful tax avoidance aside, no real economic activities are affected by the location of corporate 
profits, then such location decisions, being purely tax-driven, can only have distributional consequences. 
In that case, neutrality with respect to such decisions is a questionable goal, since it is not clear what 
normative weight should be given to the distributions resulting from decisions made when tax is neutral. 
A similar question may be raised about the second margin of corporate decisions. If the locations 
of final consumption of the goods or services produced by particular firms are fixed and known, and if the 
firms’ profits can be taxed by reference to such locations, then the open-economy-based objection to 
taxing the normal rate of return on internationally mobile capital falls away. Whatever other 
considerations there are against taxing the normal return on capital (e.g. potential distortions of individual 
saving decisions), the deadweight loss associated with the mobility of capital is no longer one of them. 
Therefore, the “destination” aspect of DCFT undermines the rationale of the “cash flow” aspect. 
These questions suggest that the neutrality criteria chosen by DCFT proponents are somewhat ad 
hoc.28 But a more important question regarding the choice of normative criteria is whether they 
adequately capture the motivations of DCFT. For example, even if neutrality with respect to the above 
three margins is accepted as a useful benchmark, such neutrality does not specify a uniquely superior tax. 
Importantly, a destination-based VAT also achieves such neutrality.29  Given this, why should one not 
just regard the VAT as the international tax reform option and repeal the corporate income tax? 30  Clearly, 
considerations other than neutrality with respect to the above three margins are needed to motivate DCFT.  
One possible reply here is that perhaps DCFT proponents believe that, in countries that (unlike 
the U.S.) have both the VAT and the corporate income tax, it would not be politically feasible to raise 
VAT rates sufficiently to cover the revenue shortfall from the repeal of the corporate income tax, but it 
would be politically feasible to convert the existing corporate income tax into a DCFT.31  Alternatively, it 
may be that the attraction of a DCFT relative to the VAT lies in that, because it taxes rent accruing to 
capital but not any return to labor (while the VAT taxes both), it results in more progressivity in tax 
systems. But other tax policy instruments can also increase progressivity. Is progressivity an accidental 
                                                     
26 Dharmapala, supra note 21. 
27 Professor Dharmapala, id, for example, suggests that the BEPS project can be conceived as a coordinated anti-
avoidance effort.  
28 As compared, for example, to some of the more traditional criteria for evaluating international taxation regimes, 
such as Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality. See Rosanne Altshuler, Recent Developments in the 
Debate on Deferral, 87 TAX NOTES 255 (2000). 
29 Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International Taxation, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 268 (2004). 
See Part III.3 below for an algebraic illustration. See also Part VI infra, for the discussion of a form of formulary 
apportionment that taxes corporate profit by reference to where ultimate shareholders reside that is similarly neutral. 
30 This reform option is particularly salient for the U.S., which does not yet have a VAT, and the corporate income 
tax of which is widely regarded as badly in need of reform. See ERIC TODER & ALAN D. VIARD, MAJOR SURGERY 
NEEDED: A CALL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM OF THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 1 (2014).    
31 Why this might be the case is not clear, and DCFT proponents should elaborate on these institutional 
considerations if they are relevant. 
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consequence of DCFT proposals, or is it one of its fundamental aims? If the latter, is it relevant that the 
traditional corporate income tax may allow greater progressivity even than the DCFT, but at the cost of 
sacrificing neutrality? How should any trade-off between progressivity and neutrality be evaluated?  
This last question illustrates a more general objection, recently raised by David Weisbach,32  to 
the use of neutralities as the main guide for designing international taxation. In the context of domestic 
tax policy design, the objective is normally thought of as maximizing social welfare, which often involves 
trading efficiency losses against distributional goals that may enhance social welfare. Where efficiency 
losses cannot be eliminated, the objective is to measure the size of deadweight losses and reduce them in 
the aggregate. Moreover, the measurement of deadweight loss needs to take into account pre-existing 
distortions. In the context of international taxation, the use of the neutrality benchmarks avoids the 
complexities of this standard normative framework. Is this justified because these standard normative 
considerations cannot usefully be applied in the international tax context?33 Without clarifying such 
assumptions, the neutrality goal could turn out to be as unreliable as the much criticized traditional 
normative heuristics for designing international taxation.34 
3. The scope of the DCFT and its relationship to individual taxation 
 
The query regarding why DCFT proposals should be preferred over the VAT (assuming that both 
satisfy the neutrality criteria specified by DCFT proponents), and the fact that tax progressivity may be a 
relevant consideration, also call attention to the further question: what relationship between the DCFT and 
individual taxation is envisioned by the former’s proponents? This question is unavoidable for two 
reasons. First and most importantly, a key traditional justification given for the corporate income tax is 
that it serves as a backstop to individual income taxation and prevents individuals from indefinitely 
deferring paying the personal income tax by earning income through corporations.35 A cash flow tax on 
corporations, however, removes the normal return to capital from the tax base. It therefore would not be 
effective in denying individual shareholders the advantage of deferral. What, then, is the point of 
maintaining the tax on corporations?36  
Proponents of taxing corporations and other businesses on a cash-flow or similar basis have given 
diverse answers to this question. David Bradford’s well-known “X tax”, for example, is simply a 
consumption tax that does not aim to tax shareholders on corporate income.37 More recently, Edward 
                                                     
32  David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy (University of Chicago Coase-Sandor 
Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 697/Aug.18, 2014).   
33 Or is it because, for some reason that DCFT proponents have not explained, the existing international tax system, 
the DCFT, or other reform proposals do not differ along these potentially relevant normative dimensions, and it is 
only the three margins of corporate decisions that matter? 
34 See, also, Keen & Wildasin, supra note , at 270 (“Pareto- efficient  international  taxation  may  require production  
inefficiency  in  the  allocation  of the world's  resources:  tariffs  and  other policies  that  distort  world  production   
patterns may  actually  make  all  countries  better  off.”) 
35 TODER & VIARD, supra note 30, at 2; Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16, at 8, 12. 
36 Many will find it normatively arbitrary to leave this question unanswered while judging different kinds of 
corporate taxes by reference to neutrality benchmarks. See Weisbach, supra note 32. 
37 Bradford, supra note 4. The X tax operates like a VAT, except that wage payments are deducted by firms and 




Kleinbard has proposed the Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT), which explicitly taxes only 
economic rent at the firm level, and only the normal return to capital at the investor level.38 The BEIT 
serves as a device to measure capital income from risk taking and economic rent, instead of the traditional 
role of preventing the deferral of income by shareholders. By being explicit about the tax treatment of 
shareholders, both Bradford and Kleinbard also leave it unambiguous that their proposed taxes apply to 
all business entities, not just corporations. In contrast to these proposals, Robin Boadway and Jean-
Francois Tremblay have recently advocated a tax on corporate rent that is combined with realization-
based income taxation of shareholders.39 They view shareholder-level taxation as essential to maintaining 
the progressivity of the tax system. Taxing economic rent earned by corporations, on the other hand, is 
justified simply by the goal of generating revenue with the least level of economic distortions.40 Moreover, 
Boadway and Tremblay’s tax on corporate rent is “origin-based” and not destination-based: it allows the 
country where economic rent is earned to tax foreign claimants to the rent, which is one of the other 
traditional justifications for maintaining the corporate income tax.41 
In contrast to these other proposals to tax corporations on the cash-flow (or similar) basis, DCFT 
proponents have not been explicit about what type of individual, shareholder-level tax they assume to be 
in place. It is likely, however, that their assumptions are similar to Boadway and Tremblay’s. For example, 
in setting out the DCFT in the Mirrlees Review and comparing it with other international tax reform 
proposals, Alan Auerbach, Michael Devereux and Helen Simpson treated residence-based taxation of 
individual shareholders as relevant to evaluating the effects of corporate taxation.42 They claimed that 
taxing individual shareholders’ income earned through (but not yet undistributed from) foreign 
corporations on a current basis is impractical.43 They thus imply that individuals should not be allowed to 
defer the recognition of their income indefinitely, which implication seems to take income taxation of 
individuals as the baseline.44 However, as noted above, the DCFT carves the normal return of capital out 
of the tax base, and therefore should not be viewed as dealing with the problem of shareholder deferral. 
Therefore, the DCFT imposed on corporations presumably serves the same function as the origin-based 
                                                     
38 Edward D. Kleinbard, Reimagining Capital Income Taxation (paper presented at the Annual Symposium of the 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Saïd Business School, Oxford, UK, June 22, 2015, on file with the 
author). The BEIT implements the tax on corporate rent through a cost of capital allowance instead of immediate 
deductions for capital expenses, a distinction that is irrelevant for the purposes here. See note 16 supra.  
39 Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16.  
40 Thus it is conceivable that, under Boadway & Tremblay’s proposal, economic rent earned through corporations is 
taxed both at the corporate level and the investor level, even though the normal return to investment in corporations 
is taxed only at the shareholder level. Boadway and Tremblay do not analyze this issue. The evaluation of the 
taxation of economic rent at both corporate and shareholder levels (which may be justifiable if economic rent is 
properly measured) is further complicated by the fact that even a tax on corporate rent may be partially shifted onto 
labor, if  wage payments reflect labor rent. The presence of labor rent has been used to explain the shifting of 
corporate tax incidence in a number of recent empirical studies. See, e.g. Clemens Fuest et al., Do Higher Corporate 
Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany (IZA Discussion Paper No. 7390/May, 2013). 
41 Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16, at 28, 49; ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 911. The DCFT relinquishes this 
effect of the corporate tax. Id. 
42 ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 839. 
43 Id. 
44 As discussed above, in response to the question of why the DCFT should be considered instead of the regular 
VAT, DCFT proponents may claim progressivity properties for the DCFT. However, if the personal income tax is 
already assumed by DCFT proponents to be in place, the question can be raised why the personal income tax should 
not be relied on exclusively for achieving progressivity. 
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tax on corporations proposed by Boadway and Tremblay: rather than a device for protecting the integrity 
of the personal income tax, it is simply a separate tax instrument that should be evaluated separately by 
reference to its efficiency and distributional consequences.45  
A second reason for inquiring into the envisioned relationship between the DCFT and individual 
taxation has to do with the DCFT’s scope of application. In particular, would the DCFT apply only to 
corporate entities, or would it apply to unincorporated business entities as well?46 Here, DCFT proponents 
seem to face conflicting considerations. On the one hand, unincorporated business entities pose a 
distinctive issue only when their owners (unlike shareholders of corporations) are taxed on a current basis 
on income earned through such entities. Moreover, such taxation is presumably implemented on a 
residence basis by the individual owners’ countries of residence. In such cases, the distortions of source-
based taxation in theory either do not arise or are minimized.47 Consequently, the normative rationale for 
taxing such entities on a destination basis is limited. On the other hand, confining the DCFT to the 
corporate sector raises difficult implementation issues (which will become clear as we discuss the specific 
versions of the DCFT in Parts II-IV). For example, the destination country may need to decide how a 
foreign entity is taxed under foreign laws. Therefore, any practically implementable version of the DCFT 
will likely have to be imposed on all business entities, whereas origin-based taxes on corporate rent such 
as the kind described by Boadway and Tremblay can practically be limited to corporations.  
There is yet another perspective on this question. If the DCFT is viewed simply as an efficient 
revenue generating device that has its independent rationale apart from the personal income tax, the need 
to closely coordinate firm- and shareholder-level taxes may be less urgent. As already stated, the DCFT 
cannot be a backstop to personal income tax because it leaves the normal return to capital out of the tax 
base. Moreover, it may have a progressive effect in addition to any progressivity built into individual 
taxation. From this perspective, imposing a DCFT on flow-through entities in addition to the personal 
income tax already imposed on the owners of such entities is no more problematic than imposing the 
DCFT on corporations in addition to the personal income tax already imposed on shareholders. In other 
words, the distinction between corporations and flow-through entities only matter to the income tax, but 
should be irrelevant to DCT proponents.48  
                                                     
45 As discussed in note 41 supra, the DCFT differs from origin-based taxes on corporate rent in that foreign 
claimants to such rent are no longer taxed by the government where the rent arises. 
46 This is an important question especially for U.S. policymakers, since most businesses in the U.S. today are taxed 
on a flow-through basis (and such businesses accounted for 56% of taxable business profits in 2008). TODER & 
VIARD, supra note 30, at 5. Flow-through taxation is less important in Canada and many other countries than it is in 
the U.S., both because of greater efforts at integrating corporate- and shareholder- level income taxation in the past, 
and because flow-through entities are used less frequently in these countries than in the U.S. (probably only in part 
because of the smaller discrepancy in the tax treatment of corporate and non-corporate forms). 
47 It is true that the income of flow-through entities may also be owned by corporations. However, it is not clear how 
such income is to be taxed to corporations on a destination basis.  
48 Contrast this analysis with the reasoning of Devereux and de la Feria supra note 3, at 14. They assert that the 
destination-based tax should be applied to all businesses, but in the case of non-corporate entities subject to flow-
through taxation, the tax should be creditable against personal income tax. It is not clear why they regard this as 
necessary. In addition, as discussed in Part III.4, the incidence of the DCFT (as envisioned by Devereux and De le 
Feria) does not fall on the owners of the business subject to the DCFT, thus giving a credit to owners would generate 
a windfall for them. 
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4. A note about framing 
 
Before discussing specific versions of DCFT proposals, it is useful to pause and make two 
remarks on the stylized setup in Figure 1. First, the novelty of the DCFT proposals, we have anticipated, 
is introducing the country D in the picture, whereas previously only the countries of residence and source 
(R, O, and H49) have been considered. This sense of novelty—and even counter-intuitiveness—relies on 
the distinctness of D from R and O. In particular, presenting the DCFT as a matter of taxing corporate 
profits by reference to a non-manipulable factor (thus offering a superior alternative to the traditional 
corporate income tax) suggests that country D’s tax policy—in particular, its choice of tax rates—will 
affect X’ after-tax income and ultimately the after-tax investment returns of X’s shareholders in R.50 
Moreover, a transfer should occur from X’s profits to D’s government. However, if the effect of the 
DCFT is such that it simply changes consumer prices in D, but has no effect on either X’ after-tax income 
or the after-tax investment returns of X’s shareholders in R, then the DCFT is no longer a tax on corporate 
income or profit. Moreover, if D’s choice of tax rates matters only because it is assumed that X’s 
shareholders reside in D—that is, R and D turn out to be the same country—then the claim that a new 
policy option is introduced may obfuscate more than it illuminates. This, we will see in Part III.3, forms 
one horn of the dilemma facing Version 2 (and Version 3) of DCT proposals.  
Second, in the setup in Figure 1, it is stipulated that where the final consumers of X’s produces 
live is non-manipulable. The identity of D, that is, is fixed regardless of the location of X’s activities. The 
question can be raised, however, whether the same cannot be said about the identity of R, the location of 
the ultimate individual shareholders that supply capital to MNCs. If the same can be said about R, then 
why should we not try to tax X’s profit by reference to R instead of D? In Parts VI, I will argue that 
although the identity of neither R nor D is easily available under current international tax paradigms, the 
identity of R is more likely to be transmitted by market mechanisms than the identity of R.  
II. DCFT Version 1: Taxing Corporate Profit in the Country of Destination 
 
Proponents of the DCFT have stressed its conceptual motivations and advantages; proposals for 
detailed implementation are still supposed to be work in progress.51 However, to fix ideas, it is important 
to consider some simple versions of the tax. This Part reviews “DCFT Version 1,” which can be simply 
described using the set-up laid out in Part I.1 supra.52 Consider X, which is incorporated and engages in 
production in country O, but suppose that X sells all of its products to consumers in country D. Suppose 
that X’s cash-flow profits can be accurately measured: capital expenditures, for example, are immediately 
                                                     
49 H may be considered as a country of source if it is a potential candidate for the location of production. As a tax 
haven country where no real economic activities take place and no real shareholders reside, It is also now often 
regarded as the location of “stateless income”—a country of no taxation. See, generally, Edward D. Kleinbard, 
Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011). 
50 Under the current international tax regime such investment return can be affected only by the tax rates in R and in 
O. 
51 See, e.g., Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 3; Parillo, supra note 8 .  
52 This version of the DCT is suggested but set aside in ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 883. 
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deducted.53 Under an “origin-based” cash flow tax,54 such profits of X would simply be taxed in O, where 
X’s production is located. This is analogous to the “source”-based income taxation of X’s income under 
the current international income tax regime—the source of active business income is where the business 
is carried out. Under the destination-based cash flow tax, by contrast, sales to final consumers in D would 
be identified by D’s tax authorities. Such sales create a potential tax liability in D for all vendors 
(domestic and foreign), including X. Since the tax is not a tax on sales but on business profits, however, 
the extent of X’s tax liability in D depends on X’s costs that are allocable to the sales in D, even if they 
are incurred in O. Under DCFT Version 1, D would allow such deductions. On the other hand, if O also 
adopts DCFT Version 1, O collects no tax from X, since no sale to final consumers is made in O. 
Essentially, the profit that would have been taxed in country O under a source- (or origin-) based 
international tax regime is taxed in D instead. This is the switch from source- to destination-based 
taxation. 
As explained in Part I, the motivation for thus giving D a tax base that used to belong to O is that, 
if X knows that the locations of the final consumers are the only thing that will determine the tax rates at 
which its profits will be taxed, it will not locate production in O just because O has a lower tax rate. It will 
also not to try to shift profit out of O, for example to H, since that will not prevent its profits from being 
taxed in D. Moreover, since X’s tax base is measured on the cash-flow basis, the tax does not distort X’s 
marginal investment decisions. 
Despite achieving the neutrality objectives stated for the DCFT in general, DCFT Version 1 is not 
favored by DCFT proponents.55 It nonetheless illustrates some of the fundamental issues facing all 
proposals for destination-based taxation. DCFT Version 1 is closely related to various proposals for 
taxing corporate profits by formulary apportionment according to a sales-only factor.56  The main 
difference is that formulary apportionment is typically considered in the income tax context,57 whereas 
under DCFT Version 1, what is taxable in D is X’s cash flow profit.58 However, the main objections to 
                                                     
53 For simplicity, in this Article I will only discuss the versions of the DCFT that disregard financial flows—the “R-
based” version, as opposed to the “R+F” version, of the taxes. See ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 886-8, for discussions 
of a version of the DCFT that takes into account both real (“R”) and financial (‘F”) cash flows of a business. 
54 This is essentially the proposal for corporate tax reform in Canada advanced by Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 
16.  Boadway & Tremblay discuss the distinction between the cash flow tax and a tax on corporate economic profit 
using either the capital cost allowance or ACE, id, at 45-7.  
55 ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 883. 
56 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 9; Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is it 
Better than the Current System and are there Better Alternatives? 63 NATL TAX J. 1145, 1148 (2010); Harry Grubert 
& Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 
66 NATL TAX J. 671, 705 (2013); TODER & VIARD, supra note 30, at 23.  
57 FA may apply to all of corporate income, or to only residual profits from some (e.g. intangible) assets. See, e.g. 
Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 9; Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347, 417-19, 434 (2013). 
58 A further difference is that formulary apportionment (FA) assumes that the governments of different jurisdictions 
(i.e. countries or states within a single country) already have the jurisdiction to tax the profits of a business. FA 
operates only to determine how much should be taxed by each jurisdiction. If a corporation is not treated as having 
established business nexus with a jurisdiction, FA by a sales-only factor may not give rise to tax in that jurisdiction 
even if sales are made there. By contrast, DCFT Version 1 may be understood as explicitly recognizing the taxing 




proposals to modify the corporate income tax through sales-factor formulary apportionment apply to 
DCFT Version 1 with equal force.  Two such objections will be discussed below, relating to (1) a 
dilemma arising from intermediate sales, and (2) the need for multilateral collaboration.   
1. The dilemma of intermediate sales 
 
A most difficult question for DCFT Version 1 is also the most obvious: how are the corporate 
profits of firms that sell only intermediate goods and services treated? Without a plausible answer to this 
question, the proposal is at most half complete, given that most international trade occurs among firms 
and a substantial portion occurs intra-firm, i.e. within multinational groups.59  But any attempt to answer 
the question faces an inescapable dilemma. On the one hand, if profits from intermediate sales are to be 
taxed on the basis of how such goods and services are used in producing ultimate consumption goods and 
services and where such consumption goods and services are sold, how is it possible to trace these 
transactions on intermediate inputs to the final consumer sales? On the other hand, if profits from 
intermediate sales are taxed in the country of the intermediate business purchaser, then the tax burden on 
corporate profit will again depend on the place of production (i.e. the location of the user of purchased 
business input). Both sellers and buyers of intermediate goods and services can gain from reducing the tax 
on such profits, and the distortions of “source-based” taxation are reintroduced. 
Let me elaborate on these two horns of the dilemma in turn. Recall that the main motivation for 
the DCFT is that the locations of final consumers are relatively immobile. Yet how are these consumer 
locations to be identified for most corporate businesses that engage in world trade? In connection with 
proposals to tax corporate income by sales-factor formulary apportionment, Harry Grubert has 
persuasively suggested that this would be impossible for broad and important classes of goods and 
services such as industrial components, capital goods, commodities sold on organized exchanges (e.g. 
agricultural products, metals, and petroleum), and business software.60 As Grubert puts it: “Where is the 
consumer for airplanes sold to a Bermuda leasing company, the consumer for microprocessors sold to a 
[company assembling computers], or copper sold on the London Metal Exchange?”61 To give a sense of 
the proportion of the problem, Grubert notes that Bureau of Economic Analysis data on U.S. exports 
indicate that more than 66% of 2012 U.S. exports were either “Industrial Supplies and Materials” or 
“Capital Goods”. “Consumer Goods” including pharmaceuticals accounted for less than 12%.62 
Grubert’s examples are intuitive and compelling. However, proponents for destination-based 
taxation (whether of corporate income or corporate cash-flow profit) may persist in believing that linking 
intermediate suppliers with the place of final consumption is possible, for two reasons. First, they may 
believe that the destination-based VAT, which is widely adopted by most countries in the world, does 
succeed in making such linkage.  Given that a real-world tax is already destination-based, why can’t the 
income tax or cash-flow tax also be destination-based?63 Second, it may be thought that the government 
                                                     
59 See note 135 infra; see also the next paragraph in the text. 
60 A Mismatch Made in Heaven, supra note 7, at __. Further, capital goods present a particular problem because the 
destination of the final consumers may change over time. Id, at __.  
61 Id, at __. 
62 Id, at __. 
63 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case for a Destination-Based Corporate Tax (University of Michigan Law School 
Draft Paper/Jul. 22 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2634391).  
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can rely on taxpayers to use market information to make generalizations about the location of final 
consumption, even if the identification of such location may not be possible on a transaction-by-
transaction basis.64 An important objective of this Article is to explain why these conjectures must be 
rejected. In Part V, I explain how the mechanisms by which the destination-based VAT is implemented in 
fact deploy no information about the place of final consumption. To believe that they do involves 
conflating two different meanings of the term “destination”. Further, I argue in Part VI that unlike 
information about the residence of individual shareholders, information about final consumers is very 
unlikely to be transmitted through market mechanisms, and therefore any government requirement to 
gather such information is unlikely to be implementable. In sum, whether through particular examples or 
through more systematic reflections, this horn of the dilemma posed by intermediate sales can be shown 
to be inescapable. 
The other horn of the dilemma for DCFT Version 1 is that allocating profits to the jurisdictions 
where intermediate sales are made easily creates economic distortions and opportunities for manipulation. 
This has also been convincingly demonstrated by Harry Grubert in connection with proposals to reform 
the corporate income tax using sales-factor-based FA.65 Grubert argues that in general, “income shifting 
under current law and a destination-based system are similar in that highly profitable companies earning 
excess returns from valuable intangibles have the greatest opportunities. The focus of tax planning 
changes from the choice of the production location and the manipulation of intercompany payments to the 
choice of sales locations. The methods companies will use depend in part on whether they produce a 
component, a capital good or a final consumer good.”66 He gave a wide assortment of examples.67 For 
instance, producers of a high-tech industrial component such as a microprocessor may earn high returns 
on their sales to assemblers, whereas the assembler may earn only a normal return. If the assembler sells 
into a high-tax country where consumers reside, only the normal return to the assembler is subject to tax. 
But if the assembler resides in a low tax country, the producer of the high-tech component would be 
subject to a low tax on its high returns if profits are allocated by the value of intermediate sales. A market 
preference could thus develop for such low-return intermediate businesses towards the end of the 
production chain located in low tax jurisdictions. Similarly, producers of high profit capital goods will 
prefer to sell to lessors or manufacturers in low tax locations. The tax advantage may be so great that the 
company will have tax-motivated reasons to break the supply chain.68 Further examples offered by 
Grubert include using conduit (but unrelated) distributors, franchising, and outsourcing marketing.69 
                                                     
64 Avi-Yonah et al.,  supra note 9, at 540-3; Reuven Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable: Toward a formulary 
approach to  allocating residuals under profit split (University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 
378/Dec. 19, 2013), at 5.  
65 A Mismatch Made in Heaven, supra note 7, at __.   
66 Id. at __.   
67 Id. at __.   
68 Conversely, Grubert notes that in the case of an exporter in a high tax country, there is an incentive for a company 
to have an integrated operation rather than buying components from independent suppliers. This is because the 
independent component seller would otherwise have been subject to high tax. If the exporter integrates, all the profit 
could be taxed at tax haven rates. Id, at __.  
69 Id, at __. Avi-Yonah supra note 64 questions whether MNCs will always be willing to give up control of 
distribution. The likelihood and degree of the distortions that Grubert identifies is certainly an empirical question, 
just like questions about whether MNCs are sensitive to source-country taxes. However, it is enough that Grubert’s 
hypothetical scenarios are far from being empirically implausible.   
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Grubert’s examples make the dilemma arising from intermediate sales concrete and vivid. It is 
also clear that the dilemma bears directly on DCFT proposals’ basic idea of taxing corporate profits by 
reference to the location of final consumers. However, Grubert draws a different conclusion from his 
examples. He suggests that “many of the problems [with proposals for destination-based income taxation] 
result from the fundamental incompatibility of income taxes, in which the timing of income and 
deductions through accruals and capitalizations is very important, and consumption tax concepts in which 
they do not play a role.”70 The main “consumption tax concept” he is referring to is presumably the 
concept of the place of final consumption, i.e. “destination”. However, since a corporate cash-flow tax, 
which does not involve “accruals and capitalizations”, faces exactly the same dilemma of implementation 
if it is designed as a form of sales-factor apportionment, it is not clear why the core tension is between 
income tax accounting and finding the place of final consumption. In other words, if the other versions of 
the DCFT can avoid the dilemma of intermediate sales faced by DCFT Version 1, we should not expect 
that it is because they attain a greater distance from income tax accounting than that first version.71  
2. The need for multilateral collaboration  
 
A second challenge for DCFT Version 1 also relates to implementation, and is also fairly obvious. 
Company X, when faced with a tax on its profits imposed by D, has incentives to over-state its costs in O 
to reduce its tax liability. In order to verify that X’s stated costs in O attributable to sales in D are true 
costs, D’s tax authority presumably will need the cooperation of the tax authority in O. By assumption, 
however, O collects no tax from X if it adopts DCFT Version 1. O’s willingness to provide such 
information to D would thus presumably be based on some kind of reciprocal arrangement. Moreover, 
since X may be making sales to many countries, its costs need to be allocated to these sales. Multilateral 
international cooperation in tax administration thus seems necessary to implement DCFT Version 1.72 
The point of this observation is not to convey the judgment that such international cooperation is 
impossible in reality. Instead, the question is whether, if such level of international cooperation is 
assumed to be feasible, DCFT Version 1 still retains any superiority to the current international tax 
regime (i.e. whether any reform to adopt destination-based taxation is still necessary). Imagine, for 
example, that O’s tax authority agreed to provide information regard X’s profits to R’s tax authority. R’s 
ability to enforce taxation of the worldwide income of its individual residents (including X’s shareholders) 
would then be much stronger than the ability of countries to do so currently. R would then be free to 
impose a high income tax rate on its residents, since individual residence is relatively immobile.73 In the 
presence of an effectively enforced residence-based international tax system, X will have little incentive 
                                                     
70 A Mismatch Made in Heaven, at __.  
71 Grubert also asserts that because the profitability (measured using income tax accounting) of exports and imports 
may differ, given balanced trade the corporate income tax followed sales-factor FA would amount to either a tariff 
or a subsidy. Id, at __.  I do not believe that this is correct, since balanced trade (i.e. zero net import and export) does 
not imply a zero tax base from trade. It should be noted, however, that if this argument of Grubert’s is correct and is 
an appropriate objection to destination-based income taxes, an analogue of it can be made against DCFT Version 1. 
72 Grubert acknowledges this issue briefly in connection with formulary apportionment proposals for the income tax 
Id, at 13. Note again that the issue applies with equal force to income and cash-flow taxes.  




to locate its production and profits in low tax countries, given that its ultimate shareholders will be paying 
the same residence country tax in any case. 
Two additional remarks can be made. First, note that the need for multilateral collaboration just 
described already assumes that O has adopted DCFT Version 1. Previous commentators on proposals to 
implement the corporate income tax by sales-factor formulary apportionment have tended to give more 
attention to a different coordination problem: if O does not adopt this type of formulary apportionment 
and retains source based taxation, X’s income would be taxed in both O and D.74 Advocates for formulary 
apportionment have suggested that in this situation, O is the country that will back down, since X is more 
likely to leave O and find an alternative country (including D) to locate production than it is to stop 
selling to consumers in D. Thus O’s adoption of DCFT can be expected to occur unilaterally without 
coordination. The adoption of DCFT is, in the words of economists, “incentive compatible”.75 However, 
it is less clear why it is in the unilateral interest of X to provide information to the tax authorities in D (or 
R). The problem of administrative cooperation is thus the harder problem for formulary apportionment.  
Second, the argument just given is that if effective administrative cooperation between countries is 
assumed, destination-based taxation would be no better than residence-based taxation. This again 
highlights the implicit rejection of residence-based taxation made by DCFT proponents.76 But in Part VI, 
I will go further and argue that it is more likely for administrative cooperation to succeed between O and 
R than between O and D, given underlying market mechanisms for information transmission. Residence-
based taxation, therefore, will turn out to be not just no worse than destination-based taxation, but 
superior. 
III. DCFT Version 2: Still a Tax on Corporate Profits? 
1. A VAT with full loss refund and deductions for labor cost  
 
Given the obvious implementation challenges facing DCFT Version 1, it is not surprising that 
other versions of the tax have been advanced. One such preferred version is succinctly summarized in the 
Mirrlees Review: 
“A more plausible alternative [than Version 1] would be to organize the tax in the 
same way as a destination-based VAT. Indeed, value added as measured by VAT is equal 
to the sum of economic rent and labour income. In a closed economy, a VAT which also 
gave relief for labour costs would be equivalent to an R-based cash flow tax. All real 
costs, including labour costs…would be deductible from the tax base. In an open 
economy, a destination-based VAT which also gave relief for labour costs would be a 
destination-based, R-based, flow-of-funds tax….  
“How would such a destination-based cash flow tax allocate costs between 
countries? It would relieve those costs in the exporting country in which they were 
incurred. Just as for VAT, an exporting company would not be taxed on its exports…. 
                                                     
74 Id; Avi-Yonah, Splitting the Unsplittable, supra note 64, at 3.   
75 Devereux & Vella, supra note 3, at 19.  
76 See Part I.4 supra.  
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Any VAT [sic] a company had already paid on intermediate goods would be refunded. A 
destination-based cash flow tax would need additionally to give a refund to reflect the 
cost of labour. A company which exported all its goods would therefore face a negative 
tax liability, reflecting tax relief for the cost of its labour.”77  
Thus under DCFT Version 2, the tax base of a company like X (in the Figure 1 setup) is 
determined by the tax systems of different countries. In the country of sale (D), only revenue is taken into 
account, which clearly over-states X’s profit. However, in the country of production (O), all production 
costs (including labor costs) and capital expenditures are subtracted from the tax base. In contrast to 
DCFT Version 1, whether such costs are correctly stated is verified by O’s tax authority alone, without 
D’s involvement.  
This may strike many readers as a counter-intuitive way of determining the tax liability of a 
company’s profits: if any country wants to tax any taxpayer’s profits, surely it has to take into account 
both the taxpayer’s revenue and its costs. If one government (D) looks only at revenue and the other (O) 
looks only at costs, who is taxing the profit? A key goal of this Part is to demonstrate, in a precise way, 
that this sense of counter-intuitiveness is correct, and that it implies a fundamental objection to DCFT 
Version 2.  
A first clarificatory point that should be made, however, is more straightforward. Cash-flow tax 
proponents in general—whether of the destination-based or origin-based variety78—have tended to 
suggest that, but for the fact that labor cost is deductible, such a tax is just like a VAT. It is important to 
stress that this claim is inaccurate, because one key feature of cash-flow taxes is not shared by the VAT, 
                                                     
77 ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 883-84. The terminology employed by DCFT proponents is occasionally imprecise. 
Even under the VAT, an exporter would have a negative liability and is entitled to a refund: there is just no overall 
negative tax liability when the exporter and its domestic supplier are combined. Under the DCFT, a negative liability 
arises from the further subsidy to the labor component in the value of the exporter’s sales. The following example 
illustrates. In country O, domestic supplier Y sells intermediate services worth 100 to exporter X. Y has labor cost of 
60 and no other cost. X has labor cost of 24 and input purchase of 100, and exports 150 of goods to country D. Row 
4 illustrates the tax bases in O under a destination-based VAT for X, Y and the two in the aggregate. Row 5 
illustrates the respective tax bases in O if O adopts DCFT Version 2.  
 
  Domestic supplier Y Exporter X Aggregate of X and Y 
1 Sale 100 150  
2 Cost of input purchase 0 100  
3 Labor cost 60 24 74 
4 Tax base under VAT 100 -100 0 
5 Tax base under DCFT Version 2  40 -124 -84 
6 Tax base under an origin-based cash 
flow tax 
40 26 66 
 
Under both the VAT and DCFT Version 2, X will also have a tax base of 150 in D. Under DCFT Version 2, X’s 
aggregate tax base in O and D is 26 (=150-124), whereas the aggregate tax base in O and D for both X and Y is 66 
(=150-84). These numbers (26 and 66) correspond to the last two cells in Row 6, which illustrate the relevant tax 
bases under an origin-based cash flow tax. 
78 See, e.g. Bradford, supra note 4. 
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namely the full refund of losses. Almost no real world tax systems offer tax credits/subsidies for losses.79 
What bears emphasis is that this is true not only of the income tax, but also of the VAT. In this regard, it 
is easy to be misled by the fact that for a particular firm, it is possible for VAT input tax credits to exceed 
VAT payable on sales, with the result that the firm gets a VAT refund corresponding to the excess of its 
cost of input purchases over its sales. One should not forget that this refund is for the VAT that the firm 
has previously paid on its input purchases. A VAT refund simply ensures that no tax is collected in excess 
of the value of a firm’s taxable sales. It does not require the government to offer a subsidy to any firm 
when there is a loss.80 To put it differently, the VAT taxes consumption even if the consumption is 
produced through processes generating net losses.  
Economists who advocate the cash flow tax (or other similar taxes on corporate rent) insist on the 
full refund of corporate losses for two reasons. First, the asymmetrical treatment of profit and loss 
resulting from risk-taking (i.e. profits from lucky outcomes is taxed but losses from unlucky outcomes are 
disregarded) discourages risk taking.81 Second, it is difficult to distinguish economic rent from risk-taking 
for particular firms and investments. When a firm realizes an outsized return, it is generally hard to say 
how much this is because the firm seized on an unique opportunity, and how much it is just good luck (it 
is usually both). Only by taking full account of losses in the tax system—by allowing full offset of losses 
against income and the refund of negative tax liabilities of loss in excess of income in individual firms—
can one address these two problems. There is thus decidedly a gap between what theorists recommend 
and real world taxes.  
Cash-flow tax advocates arguably miss this point when they claim similarities—but for the 
deduction for labor costs—between real-world VATs and the tax they favor in theory. For example, 
David Bradford suggested that under a VAT, any investment outlays are immediately deducted in the 
computation of VAT liability. As a result, “the general public shares in the investment and payoffs in 
proportion to the tax rate [in] making investment decisions, the taxable firm considers its share.”82 This is 
incorrect, as it obviously implies that the government shares the risk of business loss through the VAT: 
the government simply doesn’t. Insofar as a cash-flow tax requires government to make payments to 
taxpayers in excess of tax previously paid, this is a major departure from the VAT.  
The relevance of this observation is two-fold. First, terminologically, it is more accurate to refer 
to (portions of) the payment the exporter in O receives from O’s government not as a refund, but as a 
grant or a subsidy. A refund implies tax has previously been paid, whereas under cash flow tax 
mechanisms, any payment made to the exporter by O’s government in connection with wages 
                                                     
79 Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16, at 30, briefly mention subsidies for losses under the Norwegian resource 
rent taxes in the petroleum and hydro power sectors. 
80 This is true not only of the invoice-credit type VAT: it is commonly believed that a subtraction-type VAT should 
also generally be designed so as not to require the government to be out of pocket overall. ALAN SCHENK, VICTOR 
THURONYI & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 15 ((2d ed. 2015). 
81 Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16, at 12, 30, 
82 David Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 132, 
132 (Michael J. Boskin, ed., 1996). This conflation of the theoretical cash-flow tax and the VAT also appears in 
Bradford’s explanations of the economics of transition to a VAT. See the “tomato juice” problem in Bradford, supra 
note 4, at 32-34. 
21 
 
corresponds to no previously paid tax.83  Second, the labor subsidy for exported goods and services 
required by DCFT Version 2 raises concerns both regarding trade distortions and WTO-compliance (see 
the next subpart) and regarding its revenue impact (see Part III infra). If DCFT proponents are willing to 
describe a version of the tax that functions more like existing real-world taxes and eschews negative tax 
bases, these concerns will be mitigated to some extent. But the central objection to DCFT Version 2, as 
expressed in the dilemma articulated immediately below, may remain. Moreover, given that no DCFT 
proponent has yet considered a version of the tax that does not offer unlimited refunds, this Article does 
not pursue such variations either.     
2. The problem of export subsidies: the first horn of a dilemma 
 
To return to the analysis of DCFT Version 2, consider the following example. Suppose that X 
produces in country O a unit of a good while incurring material costs of 10 and labor cost of 5. Suppose 
that the world producer price of the good is 14. All prices are expressed in tax-exclusive terms. X’s 
production of the good is thus unprofitable and loses one dollar per unit. However, under DCFT Version 
2, not only would X be refunded all previous tax borne by its non-labor inputs, thus ensuring that the 
material cost is 10 and no more, but it should also get a grant for its labor cost. Suppose that O’s domestic 
tax rate is 20%. Then X would get 1 dollar of grant from O’s government per unit produced. This allows 
X to break even. It seems, therefore, that the DCFT has the effect of an export subsidy.  
This objection to a destination-based cash-flow tax has long been known in the U.S. literature on 
implementing consumption taxation through a cash flow tax at the business level.84 The institutional/legal 
version of the objection is that a destination-based cash-flow tax would be in conflict with the GATT 
prohibition on export subsidies.85 For example, under the so-called “X-tax” devised by David Bradford, 
wage payments are removed from the cash flow tax base of a business (including but not limited to 
corporations), and are taxed instead to the wage earners at progressive rates capped at the business tax 
rate. The actual tax collected from wages would thus be less than the reduction in the amount of business 
tax resulting from the deduction for wages. If an exporting business nonetheless gets a payment from the 
government equal to the tax rate multiplied by the wage component in the exported products (which 
includes the wage payment of both the exporter and its domestic suppliers), then the payment exceeds the 
previous taxes paid and constitutes a subsidy. This was generally regarded as being in conflict with the 
GATT prohibition on export subsidies.86 In response, Bradford advocated an origin-basis cash flow tax in 
order to be consistent with the GATT, notwithstanding the problems (particularly with regard to transfer 
pricing) this created.87 It would seem that DCFT Version 2, which contemplates the simple removal of 
                                                     
83 In the numerical example given in footnote 77 supra, 84 dollars out of the 124 dollars of payments to X represent 
the grant/subsidy for labors cost incurred by X and Y, while only 40 is a refund of the previous cash flow tax paid 
by Y. 
84 See, e.g., Grubert & Newlon, supra note 4, at 643-44 n.6, n.7; Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected 
International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1029, 1050-54 (1997); David 
Weisbach, Does the X Tax Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L. REV. 201, 213 (2003). 
85 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 67 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
86 In addition, there was a concern that any type of subtraction-type cash-flow tax that does not sufficiently track 
whether previous purchases of non-labor input have been subject to tax would create export subsidies. See Shay & 
Summers, supra note 84, at 1052-56.  
87 Bradford, supra note 4, at 12-13. By contrast, David Weisbach argued that an origin-based cash flow tax was 




wage payments from the tax base, with no corresponding mechanism to tax the wage component, would 
generate even greater subsidies. Boadway and Trembaly, in recently proposing an origin-based tax on 
corporate rent, make exactly this objection to DCFT Version 2.88 
In the U.S. literature on implementing consumption taxation through a cash-flow business tax, 
some authors have thought that a relevant defense against this objection is the theoretical equivalence 
between destination- and origin-based VATs that economists have postulated under restrictive 
conditions.89 However, it is easy to see how the requisite conditions for such equivalence do not hold for 
cash-flow taxes. Among VAT theorists, it is recognized that the most fundamental way in which the 
equivalence fails for the VAT is that the equivalence requires all commodities be taxed at the same rate.90 
This is far from being the case for real-world VATs because of the prevalence of VAT exemptions. Under 
DCFT Version 2, different levels of grants/subsidies would be given to different types of exported 
products, due to the varying proportions of labor value in them. Therefore the uniform tax rate assumption 
also fails.  
DCFT proponents generally appear to recognize this point.91  Nonetheless, they have mostly 
simply asserted that there is no export subsidy built into their tax.92 The most likely argument for this 
assertion is that the wage subsidy O offers to labor employed in producing exported goods and services 
may cause the wage in the export sector (and those sectors that supply to the export sector) in O to rise.93 
That is, in the example given at the beginning of this subpart, the wage subsidy would cause X’s cost of 
labor to rise from 5 to 6, and X thus would suffer losses and exit from the market notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
admits that GATT is perhaps not entirely erroneous in suspecting that export subsidies may come into play. 
Weisbach, supra note 84, at 219 (writing from the U.S. perspective, as if it is country O in our example above: 
“trading partners will rightly claim that we are subsidizing certain exports (although we would be penalizing others 
because exchange rates would adjust on average).”) 
88 Boadway & Tremblay, supra note 16, at 47. 
89 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES (April 5, 
2014) 91, 107-8. The idea of the equivalence is that the difference between (i) zero-rating exports and taxing imports 
(destination-based taxation), and (ii) taxing exports and allowing business imports to be deducted (origin-based 
taxation) is neutralized by a single exchange rate adjustment. If this is true, one argument is that the GATT 
prohibition on export subsidies through direct taxes is theoretically benighted by failing to recognize the economic 
equivalence between taxes that involve such prohibited subsidies and those that do not. 
90 Only so would the effect of zero-rating for exports and taxing imports be offset by a single exchange rate 
adjustment. See, e.g. Michael Keen & Walter Hellerstein, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT, 63 TAX 
L. REV. 359, 363 (2010). 
91 ADS 2010, supra note 4 at 884. Auerbach et al also point to the conditions of (i) no cross-border shopping or labor 
mobility, and (ii) perfect competition, for the theoretical equivalence between destination- and origin-based taxes to 
hold. However, the assumption of no cross-border shopping or labor mobility is of course fundamental to the 
motivation of DCFT proposals. Moreover, in modeling the effect of DCFT Version 2, Auerbach and Devereux also 
assume perfect competition. AD 2013, supra note 12, at 5. Thus the primary reason for assuming that the 
equivalence fails should be non-uniformity of tax rates. 
92 ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 884 (“…countries would not be subsidizing exports (since the export price would be 
unaffected)…”). See an equally cryptic dismissal of the export subsidy concern in Michael Devereux & Stephen 
Bond, Cash Flow Taxes in an Open Economy (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3401/ 
May 2002), at 23. 
93 Parillo, supra note 8 at 320 (quoting Michael Devereux as responding to the objection that DCFT Version 2 gives 
rise to an export subsidy by claiming “prices would adjust — just like under a VAT — so that the tax is neutral with 
respect to the location of investment and economic activity.’’) 
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export subsidy. In effect, proponents of DCFT Version 2 may be assuming that labor claims the entire 
benefit of the subsidy/grant for wage payments—it bears the full incidence of such a subsidy.94  
The theoretical and empirical validity of such an assumption of the incidence of a tax benefit on 
labor is not something that this Article purports to evaluate.95 Instead, the important point here is that this 
type of assumption may be necessary for DCFT Version 2 to deflect the objection that it offers a 
distortionary trade subsidy. Even in the absence of WTO legal prohibitions, distortionary trade subsidies 
presumably should be viewed as undesirable, just as distortions of corporate decisions on locations of 
production and the intensity of capital investments are. The objection that DCFT Version 2 may run afoul 
of WTO law, therefore, should not be seen as an extraneous critique, but as relevant in DCFT proponents’ 
own terms. However, if it is valid to assume that the tax benefit granted to labor under DCFT Version 2 is 
fully incident on labor—it causes wage to rise by the full amount of the benefit—then a different, and 
arguably detrimental, objection to DCFT Version 2 arises. 
3. Does it tax corporate profits? The second horn of the dilemma  
 
This alternative objection can be seen by considering the question: Does the tax rate in O matter 
to X under DCFT Version 2? This is an obvious question to ask, since what motivate DCFT proposals are 
the economic distortions of source-based corporate taxes, under which the tax rate in the country of 
production (O) does matter.  
On the face of it, X’s tax liability, as well as the nominal tax rate on its profit, will depend partly 
on the tax rate in O, and not just on the tax rate in D. For example, suppose D’s tax rate is tD and O’s tax 
rate is tO (both are expressed in tax-exclusive terms),96 and that X has R dollars of sales in D (R* (1+tD) 
dollars in tax-inclusive terms), and P dollars of non-labor input cost in O (P* (1+tO) dollars in tax-
inclusive terms). Assume for the moment negligible labor costs—which means that the immediately 
following calculation holds for both the VAT and DCFT Version 2, since the difference between the two, 
when there are no losses, consists in the deduction for labor costs.97 Then X’s net tax payment under 
DCFT Version 2 would be R*tD-P*tO, as it would be under a VAT. Whether we express this as a 
                                                     
94 This assumption has not been elaborated in the existing literature on DCFT. In the formal model in AD 2013, 
supra note 12, Auerbach and Devereux assume that when a country imposes a tax t on imports, wages and other 
prices will go up by t. AD 2013, supra note 12, at 20. There is no separate discussion of wage and the justification 
for assuming its rise along with other prices in the model. It is thus unclear whether cash flow tax theorists assume 
that, as a general equilibrium consequence, wage for labor used for purely domestic production will rise because of 
the grant for labor used in exported production. Moreover, it is unclear whether an origin-based cash flow tax would 
have a similar effect on wages. 
95 The economic incidence of taxes on wages such as income and payroll taxes, and of tax benefits such as the 
earned income tax credit and incentives for employer hiring, is theoretically and empirically controversial. For a 
recent review, see Emmanuel Saez et al., Earnings Determination and Taxes: Evidence From a Cohort-Based 
Payroll Tax Reform in Greece, 127 Q. J. ECON. 493 (2012). 
96 I use tax-exclusive tax rates and prices, which can be converted easily into tax-inclusive ones. The invoice-credit 
VAT usually expresses tax rates in tax-exclusive terms, whereas the subtraction-type VAT usually uses tax-inclusive 
expressions. Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 10-11, state that their proposal does not rely on the invoice-
credit method of administration. Many other expositions of the cash flow tax also proceed as though an analogue of 
the subtraction-type VAT would be adopted. See, e.g.  AD 2013, supra note 12; Bradford, supra note 4.  
97 I am grateful to Ed Kleinbard for highlighting this point for me. 
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percentage of before-tax profit (=R* (1+tD) - P* (1+tO)) or of after-tax profit (= R-P), the percentage will 
depend on tD as well as tO.  
However, the example also shows that whatever values tD and tO take, X’s after-tax profit will 
always be R-P. The value of tO in particular will not change X’s bottom line. In this sense, then, the tax 
rate in O does not matter to X, and therefore will not influence X’s location decisions.98 This simply 
illustrates the point, made in Part I, that both the DCFT and the VAT (equivalent to the DCFT in the 
absence of labor costs) achieve neutrality on the location decision margin. But by the same token, it is 
also evident that whatever tax is levied in D, X’s after-tax profit will be the same and equal R-P. D’s tax 
rate tD does not matter to such profit, either.  
This is an appropriate property for a destination-based VAT to demonstrate, since the destination-
based VAT equates producer prices for all goods sold into a single market, regardless of where the good 
is produced. But it seems to be a wrong property for any tax that purports to be a tax on X’s profits to 
display: the idea of a tax on corporate (pure) profit implies that it should alter the amount of profit 
accruing to the company’s shareholders. This surely underlies the idea that a tax on pure profit can be 
close to 100% without being distortionary. But if a given tax only changes the prices of a company’s 
inputs and outputs (and the amounts of its tax payments), without changing its after-tax profits, then the 
tax does not bear on profits in the normally understood sense. 
Consider now what happens if X’s production involves non-negligible labor costs. DCFT Version 
2 and the VAT are no longer equivalent. However, if the adoption of DCFT Version 2 by country O, at 
the tax rate tO, simply causes the wage level in O to rise by a factor of t, then again neither the tax rate 
adopted by O nor the tax rate adopted in D will affect the after-tax profit of X. Yet such a tax incidence 
effect is precisely what DCFT proponents need to assume to deflect objections based on potential trade 
distortions.  
This discussion simply articulates the sense of counter-intuitiveness stated at the beginning of this 
Part: how can any country tax a business’ profit, when it knows either only the revenue or only the cost 
side of the business’ operations? Presumably, the idea of DCFT Version 2 is that O and D’s tax policies 
would have this result in the aggregate, even when the two countries act independently, and each of them 
indeed has information about only one of the two components that go into the profit calculation. But the 
closer examination suggests that DCT proponents, by assuming all effects of O’s and D’s taxes to be 
reflected in input (including labor) and product prices, have assumed away any possibility for such taxes 
to affect X’s profit. X’s profit bears no incidence of either O’s or D’s tax. 
This suspicion can now be pressed against the more theoretical derivation of the properties of the 
DCFT offered by Alan Auerbach and Michael Devereux.99 Through a two-country model, they conclude 
that the “destination-based tax is equivalent to a lump sum tax on the pure profits received by domestic 
residents.”100 This claim itself actually makes straightforward sense: a regular destination-based 
                                                     
98 See Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 4 (“It might be thought that [the DCT] would give an incentive to 
locate expenses in high tax countries. However, in theory at least, this should not occur. The reason is that the price 
of the intermediate goods or services used by the company would be affected by the tax.”). 
99 AD 2013, supra note 12. 
100 Id, at 20. 
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consumption-type VAT imposed by country D would tax all consumption by the residents of D, whether 
such consumption is funded by economic rent and labor income, and regardless of where such rent and 
labor income are generated. A DCFT that further excluded labor compensation from its tax base would 
then be equivalent to a tax on domestic consumption financed by economic rent accruing to capital. The 
problem, however, is that in Auerbach and Devereux’s model multinationals are equally owned by 
resident and non-resident individuals. If a DCFT imposed by D is equivalent only to a lump sum tax 
imposed on the profit accruing to the capital owned by D’s own individual residents, then the tax is not a 
tax on the profit of the multinational making sales into D, since the non-resident owners do not bear the 
burden of the tax.  
Thus it appears that in Auerbach and Devereux’s model, if country D adopts a DCFT, it imposes 
a tax on the corporate profits of foreign companies only insofar as its residents’ consumption is financed 
(partly) out of such profits. If a foreign company’s sales to final consumers in D give rise to profits, but 
such profits do not finance consumption in D, then D imposes no tax on that foreign company’s profits. If 
this is correct, then even if DCFT Version 2 displays all the efficiency properties that its proponents 
ascribe to it, it seems inaccurate to describe the tax as taxing X’s profits.  
Is this just semantics? I believe the answer is no. Some substantive, normative promise of 
“taxation by reference to destination” that is implicit in DCFT proposals is being short-changed. To see 
this, note that DCFT Version 2 essentially describes a tax on X’s profits depending on where the 
consumption financed by X’s profits takes place. In terms of the Figure 1 set-up, D succeeds to tax X’s 
profit not because X sells to D, but because for some of X’s ultimate individual owners, the country of 
residence, “R”, happens to be just D. This belies the claim that D succeeds to impose a tax on X’ profit by 
virtue of the fact that X makes sales to consumers there. No part of X’s profit is allocated to D, any more 
than such profit is allocated to O, unless X’s ultimate shareholders reside in D. Contrast this with the 
VAT—a destination-based consumption tax. The VAT is understood to be destination-based in two 
senses: the rate of tax born by consumption in country D depends only the VAT rate is D; and the revenue 
from consumption in country D accrues to country D.101 Consumption in country D bears the incidence of 
D’s tax and revenue moves from D’s consumers to D’s government. By contrast, under the purported 
destination-based DCFT Version 2, the profit of X (located in O) does not bear the burden of D (where X 
makes all sales); nor does any revenue move from X’ profit to D’s government. The difference is sharp. 
4. The continued relevance of DCFT Version 1 
 
Another way of formulation the foregoing concern is that the distribution effects of DCFT 
Version 2—in terms of the revenue allocable to different nations—could be drastically different from the 
distribution effects of DCFT Version 1, were the latter implementable (for example, if we assume that 
there are multiple countries engaged in trade but all imports are for final consumption in the importing 
country). Of course, it may not be obvious what is intrinsically attractive about the distributive 
consequences of allocating the right to tax corporate (or all business) profits according to the place of 
final consumer sales made by the relevant businesses. There certainly have been political interests in 
changing the allocation of international taxing rights among nations in this fashion. In response to the 
                                                     
101 LIAM P. EBRILL ET AL., THE MODERN VAT 176-7 (2001). 
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media expose of the types of tax planning engaged by companies like Starbucks, for example,102 many 
intuitively ask: how could Starbucks not pay any tax in the UK when its sales to customers in its UK 
stores are generating so much profit? However, there may be rebuttals to this question. And even if the 
implications of the question are accepted, it is still a large further step to allocate taxing rights in such a 
way that only the UK would be taxing Starbucks’ profits arising from sales into the UK as “taxation by 
destination” implies.  
Still, destination-based taxation probably holds at least some appeal because of its implications 
for the distribution of revenue among nations. The analysis of DCFT Version 2, above, however, suggests 
that people should be disabused of this notion. If all countries adopt DCFT Version 2, the result would 
simply be a species of residence-based taxation of corporate profits. The countries hosting consumers but 
not shareholders will not get any greater piece of the pie that is the MNCs’ profits. 
There is some evidence that DCFT proponents are themselves equivocal about what allocation 
effects a destination-based tax should achieve. The evidence consists in arguments made for the tax that 
would be more appropriate for DCFT Version 1 than for Version 2. As discussed in Part II, DCFT 
Version 1 faces seemingly insuperable implementation problems. These problems do not threaten DCFT 
Version 2, which may seem to be an important reason to distinguish them. However, DCFT proponents 
tend to run the two versions together. For example, Michael Devereux and Rita la Feria, in a working 
paper that mainly elaborates on Versions 2 (and 3, discussed in the next Part) of the DCFT, offer an 
extended discussion of whether the country of destination can legitimately claim “substantive tax 
jurisdiction” over the profits of foreign corporations.103 It is easy to see how such a question can arise for 
DCFT Version 1.104 But it is very hard to see how this question even arises for DCFT Version 2, given 
the latter’s analogies to the VAT: that the destination country has “substantive tax jurisdiction” over 
imported goods and services seems undisputed. Thus Devereux and de la Feria must have had DCFT 
Version 1 in mind in their “substantive tax jurisdiction” discussion. 
Yet another example is where Devereux and de la Feria suggest that, to avoid the implementation 
problems if the DCFT were applied only to corporate entities, the tax should be applied to all businesses 
subject to a threshold, but in the case of non-corporate entities subject to flow-through taxation, the tax 
should be creditable against personal income tax.105 This suggestion would not make sense, if the 
incidence of the DCFT (Version 2) imposed by D does not fall on the owners of the business (X) subject 
to the DCT.106 Giving them a credit for the net tax payment in D and O would only generate a windfall.107 
This suggestion does make sense, however, if the authors had DCFT Version 1 in mind. Under DCFT 
Version 1, the sense in which the tax imposed by D on X is a tax on X’s profits is as unambiguous as a 
                                                     
102 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’ Window into Stateless Income Tax Planning, 139 
TAX NOTES 1515 (2013).  
103 Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 11-14. 
104 In the example used above, X may have no business contact with (e.g. no office or operation in) country D other 
than making sales to final consumers in D. 
105 Devereux & de la Feria, Supra note 3, at 14. 
106 The discussion above suggests that it is only when the country of the owners of the business imposes a DCFT 
that such owners are subject to the burden of the tax. 
107 In addition, as discussed in Part I.3 supra, crediting shareholders for firm level taxes under a cash flow would not 
be justifiable by reference to the nature of the tax as an anti-deferral device. A cash flow tax simply cannot play the 
role of such a device.  
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tax imposed by O. Moreover, assuming that the cash flow computation of X’s profits captures the (non-
labor) economic rent earned by X, the incidence of the tax should be on the claimant of the rent, i.e. X’s 
owners. 
To sum up: as explicated by its proponents, a DCFT imposed by a country into which final 
consumer sales are made has no incidence on the profit of the foreign MNC making the sale, as long as 
the shareholders of that MNC do not reside in such country. When the MNC’s profit bears the burden of 
the DCFT, it is the burden of the DCFT adopted by the country of the MNC’s shareholders. Similarly, 
any tax collected from the MNC’s profits under the DCFT is collected by the country where the 
shareholders reside. Such a tax, wherever adopted, may be neutral with respect to the MNC’s investment 
decisions (provided that it does not distort trade through export subsidies). It may also be progressive 
when adopted in the country where the MNC’s shareholders’ reside. But its progressivity, and its ability 
to transfer funds from corporate profits to governments, obtain only in the country of residence, not in the 
country of destination qua the country of destination.   
IV. DCFT Version 3: Taxing Exports at the Origin, but at the Destination Country’s Rate  
 
Devereux and de la Feria have described a variation of DCFT Version 2, which I will treat as a 
distinct proposal in this Part. Under DCFT Version 3, the country of production and export (O) would 
actually collect tax on its exports, but at the DCFT rates set by the countries (e.g. D) to which goods and 
services are exported.108 The exporter, like other producers in O, will still be allowed to deduct the costs 
of material inputs and labor, though at O’s tax rate and not those of “destination countries”.109 This will 
ensure that the profit of company X is still taxed to exactly the same extent as it is under DCFT Version 2. 
The incentives of X in making its corporate decisions remain the same, as (presumably) do the effects of 
the tax, as adopted in O and D, on prices in both O and D. The only difference is that unless the 
government of O transfers to the government of D the revenue the former collects on exports made to D, 
it will have more revenue. In particular, exports to D would no longer generate a negative tax base for O. 
DCFT Version 3 thus preserves the efficiency but not the distributional properties of Version 2. 
This variation of the DCFT is similar to proposals for implementing the destination-based VAT 
on an origin basis within the European Union.110 Devereux and de la Feria note certain administrative 
advantages of implementing the DCFT this way,111 but attribute its main advantage to the following 
purported problem. They believe that the strongest reservation one might have against DCFT Version 2 is 
                                                     
108 Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 10. 
109 I put the term “destination countries” in brackets because the VAT-like mechanisms envisioned here even the 
countries to which goods and services are exported are not where the relevant final consumption will take place. 
Speaking of “destination countries” here thus blurs two distinct meanings of “destination”. See Part V infra.  
110 Id. at 19-20. Note that for DCT Version 3, the question of the “substantive tax jurisdiction” of D discussed by 
Devereux and de la Feria should not arise, since country O would be collecting tax on its own exporters. The 
discussion of that question thus suggests a conflation of DCT Version 3 with Version 1. See note 103 supra and 
accompanying text. 
111 Id. at 10, 22. These advantages include the potential of preventing types of fraud observed under the destination-
based VAT system from arising under the DCFT. However, insofar as DCFT Version 3 contemplates country D 
allowing deductions to importers even when it does not know whether the seller/exporter has reported the revenue to 
O, there would be serious administrative concerns. 
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that for countries with net exports, the exclusion of wage payments from the tax base—and government 
grant associated with such payments in the export sector—would be too much of a drain on O’s 
revenue.112 This, in turn, presents a concern presumably because O would be less likely to adopt DCFT 
Version 2 (due to the implication of a negative tax base)—DCFT Version 2 would then not be “incentive 
compatible”.113 
Both the purported problem identified by Devereux and de la Feria and its apparent solution are 
somewhat puzzling. First, note that the negative tax base problem may be secondary for those countries 
whose net exports are small relative to the country’s GDP—there would be a large enough domestic tax 
base to absorb the negative tax base from international trade.114 This suggests that it may be possible for 
at least a subset of countries—those that have roughly balanced trade and those that can tolerate the 
negative tax base arising from traded goods and services—to adopt the DCFT. It is not clear, then, why 
Devereux and de la Feria regard the negative tax base problem for net exporters as so important. Second, 
even if there are countries whose adoption of DCFT Version 2 is important for the adoption of the tax 
generally, and even if these countries may be prevented from such adoption because they have large 
positive trade balances relative to their domestic tax bases, adopting DCFT Version 3 simply create a 
mirror problem. There may be net importer countries whose negative trade balances are large relative to 
their GDPs. Suppose D is such a country. Under DCFT Version 3, D would still need to allow deductions 
for imported input goods and services, even though no tax is collected on them (O, by assumption, 
collects tax on the sales into D and retains the revenue). D thus would face a similar issue of aggregate 
negative tax liabilities. D, therefore, may not adopt the DCFT. DCFT Version 3 would then be no more 
incentive compatible than Version 2 (if the problem of negative tax base from trade is taken seriously). 
Devereux and de la Feria also suggests a further variation of DCFT Version 3, in which O 
transfers the revenue it collects on exports made to D back to D. In this case, both the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of DCFT Version 3 would be the same as DCFT Version 2. O will simply 
have collected tax on behalf of D. The problem with this suggestion is not only that it is highly unclear 
how it improves upon DCFT Version 2.115 More importantly, it raises a fundamental question: should 
revenue transfers among nations be assumed to be feasible in discussing the design of international 
taxation? Other scholars have argued that binding national budget constraints are a core assumption that 
defines the problem of international taxation. For example, Michael Keen and David Wildasin have 
shown that if countries can transfer revenues among themselves, the Pareto-optimal international income 
tax design would be residence-based.116 This is because residence-based taxation would guarantee that 
production efficiency is achieved and global output is maximized, and revenue transfers could then be 
used to achieve the desired pattern of distribution among nations. Administratively, this can be conceived 
                                                     
112 Id, at 10, 21. See also ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 884. 
113 Devereux and Vella, supra note 3, at 19.  
114 For example, the negative tax base problem was not emphasized when U.S. scholars and policy analysts debated 
in the 1990s about the adoption of a destination-based cash-flow tax on businesses (as a way of implementing the 
consumption tax), whereas the subject of export subsidies was. Perhaps this was because the U.S. was—and 
expected to be for some time to come—a net importer. But it could also be that any net export would be small 
relative to the size of the overall U.S. economy. 
115 If it is bad enough that O may have a negative tax base from net exports, it seems even worse for O to be 
collecting tax on behalf of D. 
116 Keen & Wildasin, supra note 29, at 264-68. 
29 
 
as a matter of source and residence countries coordinating to administer only one set of taxes—those 
taxes imposed by residence countries. Source countries would not aim to collect any taxes for themselves 
from non-residents, but only to assist residence countries. The distortions of source-based taxation would 
then disappear. In exchange, source countries would rely on revenue transfers to cover their budget 
deficits. 
This hypothetical arrangement may have some resonance within the European Union, whose 
member countries have been engaged in administrative coordination and (more limited) revenue transfers 
both in the VAT and individual income tax areas.117 However, if Keen and Wildasin is correct that 
binding national budget constraints are the defining feature of international taxation, then the feasibility of 
such arrangements should not be assumed more generally. To assume such feasibility for implementing 
the DCFT would simply assume away, rather than solve, the fundamental problems of international 
taxation. 
V. Does Introducing “Destination” Expand the Range of Policy Options?  
 
Parts III and IV above argued that the most important problems for DCFT Versions 2 and 3 are 
conceptual in nature. By contrast, DCFT Version 1 seems conceptually coherent, and the dilemma 
(arising from intermediate sales) presented in Part II.1 may appear to be about implementation. This Part 
and the next will show that the implementation problem has deep conceptual roots. The main question is: 
how does bringing the country of destination into consideration in assigning income tax jurisdictions 
broaden the range of international tax policy options?  
To start, it is important to note that, theoretically, there is a close conceptual affinity between 
residence-based individual income taxation and destination-based consumption taxation.118 This affinity 
is not widely recognized, but is easy to explain. It is typical to think of a tax on the return to savings as a 
schedule of taxes on future consumption, with the tax rates higher for acts of consumption that occur 
further in the future.119 Thus when a resident country chooses a tax rate on the capital income earned by 
its individual residents (which may be different from the tax rates chosen by other countries for their 
respective individual residents), it may be viewed as adopting a distinct set of future consumption tax 
rates for its residents. Destination-based consumption taxation, of course, is also a matter of setting 
distinct tax rates for acts of consumption that occur within different jurisdictions. Both residence-based 
capital income taxation and destination-based consumption taxation thus can be thought of as determining 
cross-country differences in consumer prices.120  Conversely, source-based capital income taxation can be 
                                                     
117 See Harry Huizinga, Commentary on ADS 2010, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 894 
(Stuart Adam eds., 2010); (discussing a policy in the EU of "promot[ing] an 'orderly,' non-discriminatory residence-
based tax system" within a framework of international coordination). 
118 See Keen & Wildasin, supra note 29 at 268.  
119 Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. 
PUBLIC ECON. 55 (1976).   
120 At the same time, they allow producers from all over the world to equate their producer prices, ensuring 
production efficiency. This is familiar, in the income tax context, from the claim that capital export neutrality (CEN) 
ensures that capital is allocated to its most efficient use. For consumption taxation, it is the basic theoretical 
argument in favor of destination-based taxation. Id, at 260-1. Keen & Wildasin shows that production efficiency is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of Pareto-optimal taxation.  
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thought of as creating systematic differences across countries in producer prices: different source 
countries must generate different pre-tax returns in order to offer the same after-tax return to investors. 
This is also the effect of “origin-based” commodity taxation.121  
Once this affinity between residence-based individual income taxation and destination-based 
consumption taxation is recognized, one can ask: how can destination-based taxation fix problems in 
international taxation that cannot be fixed by residence-based taxation? In particular, the roles of 
individuals as residents of a given country and as consumers within that country essentially overlap. 
Indeed, in theorizing about consumption taxation, the country of “destination” is often defined as the 
country where the consumers reside.122 It is also a premise of DCFT proposals that consumption activities 
are largely immobile. If a tax system can deploy information regarding individuals qua consumers, why 
shouldn’t it be able to deploy information regarding individuals qua consumers? 
The difficulty, even infeasibility, of the latter is the prevailing assumption made by those who 
theorize about international corporate taxation today.123 It might be thought that the difference is that it is 
easier to identify the timing of consumption than the timing of income. But if the challenge of residence 
taxation is mainly about timing, then a variety of devices are available to deal with deferral. For example, 
interest may accrue on tax liabilities that are deferred. This practice has been adopted in the U.S.’ rules 
for taxing income earned through passive foreign investment companies (PFIC),124 and is more generally 
proposed in the domestic taxation context for taxing capital gains.125 Moreover, as noted in Part I.3 supra, 
any proposal for corporate tax reform that removes the normal rate of return from the corporate tax base 
necessarily deprives corporate taxation of the ability to prevent shareholder deferral.   
If the challenge of resident individual income taxation lies not with the prevention of deferral, it 
must be conceived as a matter of jurisdiction and enforcement. In particular, much foreign wealth of 
resident individuals may be held in the form of foreign entities, the resident country generally lacks 
jurisdiction either to tax these entities or require them to provide information regarding income accruing 
to (or even just asset indirectly held by) the country’s own residents. Yet these same jurisdictional and 
enforcement constraints also hold in the indirect tax context. It helps to remember that the current 
international consumption and income tax regimes apply to the same patterns of world trade and 
investment. Nonetheless, DCFT proponents seem to believe that the current international consumption tax 
regime is somehow better able to gather information about consumers from these patterns than the income 
tax regime is able to gather information about residents. They appear to take the position that while the 
prevalent practice under the VAT for taxing cross-border transactions—which is “destination-based”—is 
                                                     
121 Because commodity taxation, including the VAT, normally disregards financial flows, the concept of the “origin” 
of a taxable supply under the VAT and other commodity taxes is generally narrower than the concept of “source” of 
income under income taxes, since “source” is a concept used to allocate taxing jurisdiction for income from labor as 
well as from financial capital, in addition to income from businesses.  
122 For the distinction between two different meanings of destination, see notes 128-131 infra and accompanying 
text. 
123 See, e.g. ADS 2010, supra note 4, at 880; Rachel Griffith, James Hines & Peter Birch Sorensen, International 
Capital Taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 914, 915-16, 982-83 (Stuart Adam et al. 
eds., 2010). 
124 26 U.S. Code § 1291. 
125 Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 167 (1991); Noel B. Cunningham, 
Observations on Retrospective Taxation, 53 TAX L. REV. 489 (2000). 
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still imperfect at identifying place of consumption, it does succeed in doing so to enough of an extent that 
incorporating similar information about destination into the corporate tax may expand the range of policy 
options.126 In the lingo favored by these authors, destination, a concept deployed in indirect taxation, can 
serve as a “proxy” for the place of consumption.127    
Yet this purported benefit of introducing the concept of destination is illusory. The error 
committed can be described in two ways. First, it is useful to draw a distinction between the economic 
characterization of the “destination principle” and the institutional/legal characterization of a principle by 
the same name. These are, in substance, two entirely different principles. According to the economic 
characterization, the destination principle “means that the total tax paid in relation to a commodity is 
determined by the [tax] rate levied in the jurisdiction of its final sale… [and] that all the revenue accrues 
to the government in the jurisdiction where that sale occurs.”128 Understood this way, the destination 
principle can be implemented not just through the VAT but also through a retails sales tax, under which 
sales and only sales to final consumers are taxed at the rate of the country of residence of the consumers. 
That is, the “destination principle” in the economic sense can be perfectly realized if all business-to-
business (B2B) transactions are ignored. Yet if the destination principle, in this economic sense, had been 
implemented by a retail sales tax, we would not know the destination principle as it is normally 
understood, institutionally and legally, in connection with the VAT, i.e. the zero-rating of exports and 
taxing of imports.129  
While it might seem unnecessary to belabor the foregoing distinction, the identification of 
“destination-based” taxation with the institutional mechanism of zero-rating exports is transparently 
assumed in both Versions 2 and 3 of DCFT proposals. Further, these proposals assume that zero-rating 
carries information about place of consumption. To be fair, it is not just DCFT proponents who make this 
assumption. For example, Michael Keen and Walter Hellerstein, writing purely about VAT design, 
acknowledge that “it is [individual] consumption…that underlies both the expression of and the rationale 
for the destination principle [characterized as an economic principle]. That principle is therefore entirely 
silent on which jurisdiction should tax business-to-business (B2B) transactions, which needs to be 
resolved by administrative concerns.”130 Nonetheless, they insist that “destination”—to which countries 
goods and services are exported—serves as a proxy for consumption: “The destination principle is a rule 
                                                     
126 Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3. Again, what is purportedly relevant is that information about place of 
consumption is introduced into the tax regime, and not how the information is used (e.g. whether to tax consumption 
or to allocating taxing right on corporate profits). 
127 The idea that destination is a proxy for consumption is endorsed in Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 366-368. 
128 EBRILL ET AL., supra note 101, at 176. 
129 See, e.g., SCHENK, THURONYI & CUI, supra note 80. The distinction between these two different meanings of the 
“destination principle” can be seen through the fact that the zero-rating of exports is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for realizing the destination principle under the economic characterization. It is not sufficient, since whether final 
consumption is properly subject to taxation in the country in which it occurs depends on further tax collection on 
subsequent transactions. It is also not necessary, since imposing a positive tax on cross-border sales to final 
consumers is another (actually adopted) method of tax collection. Similarly, taxing imports is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for taxing final consumption in the country of import. For imports by taxable suppliers (i.e. those that are 
not exempt from the VAT), taxation or non-taxation of imported input purchases makes no essential difference. And 
whether final consumption is properly taxed depends on tax collection by the importing suppliers or suppliers 
further downstream. 
130 Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 367 (they emphasize that “the considerations that should guide decisions on 
the place of taxation for border-crossing B2B transactions ultimately must be pragmatic.”).  
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of tax administration that seeks to approximate the location of consumption in a sensible and 
administrable fashion.”131 This conflation, unfortunately, is no less erroneous by being not unique to 
DCFT proponents.  
Second, while there are particular rules under the VAT laws of different countries that attempt to 
identify the place of individual final consumption, it would be erroneous to assume that this is what VAT 
“place of supply” or “place of consumption” rules do in general. Generally, VAT rules implement a tax 
on consumption not by identifying consumption activities, but by identifying the opposite—business 
activities. In technical terms, what is crucial to VAT is not the imposition of tax on sales, but the 
allowance of deductions for input purchases to businesses. Therefore, as a general matter, both sales to 
business and to individual consumers (i.e. B2B and B2C transactions) are subject to tax, but only 
businesses can claim deductions. And because consumption activities generally do not qualify as 
businesses and therefore do not give rise to deductions, they end up bearing the burden of the VAT. The 
legally intensive effort to delineate between consumption and non-consumption under VAT laws takes 
the form chiefly of distinguishing between business and non-business activities on the side of the 
purchaser, not of distinguishing, on the part of the seller, between different types of sales. It is within this 
general context that zero-rating under the VAT operates. Indeed, the mechanism of zero-rating is often 
adopted under VATs within purely domestic contexts.132 The point of such mechanisms is generally to 
ensure there is no tax-induced distortion in the business decisions of the purchaser.133 Zero-rating in the 
cross-border context serves exactly the same function, namely avoiding distortions in B2B transactions—
not taxing final consumption.  
How, then, have the zero-rating of exports and taxing of imports for B2B transactions resulted in 
final consumption being taxed largely where it occurs? The explanation is rather simple. First, relatively 
few consumer goods traditionally have been directly imported by retail customers; most importation of 
goods has involved B2B transactions.134 Second, most consumption services are traditionally supplied 
domestically. These two facts have allowed a set of rules mainly governing cross-border B2B transactions 
to work. But where either goods or services are supplied cross-border directly to final consumers, the 
enforcement of the VAT becomes much more challenging, and the VAT has no advantage over the retail 
sales tax in relation to such supplies. Indeed, for cross-border supply of services to final consumers, the 
destination principle—understood in the economic sense—has, at least up till now, been largely 
unenforceable. It thus seems inaccurate to suggest (as the idea of “destination as proxy” does) that 
somehow, the destination principle as embodied by the VAT has already incorporated information about 
place of final consumption.   
The preceding two arguments make references to features of VAT law to explain why it is 
implausible to view VAT mechanisms as embodying “proxies” for the location of consumption. There is 
an even more intuitive argument. “Destination”, as used under VAT law, simply denotes the location of 
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132 See SCHENK, THURONYI & CUI, supra note 129, at 260-9.  
133 If zero-rating is used in connection with sales to final consumers (as in the zero-rating of food in a number of 
countries and the zero-rating of housing sales in the U.K.), the policy intention is precisely the non-taxation of 
consumption. Where the policy intent is to tax consumption, zero-rating is not the mechanism to accomplish it. 
134 This pattern itself may change, as a result of platforms like Alibaba.com which match manufacturers and final 
consumers from different countries directly with one another. 
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the customer in cross-border transactions. However, if one-third of international trade takes place between 
related entities in multinational groups,135 and if in countries like the U.S. over 90% of imports flows 
through only a sub-group of firms,136 “the customer” in a cross-border transaction is only in a very small 
percentage of cases an individual consumer. How then could we expect the concept of destination, which 
corresponds to the location of all customers, to be a proxy for the place of final consumption?   
In summary: what is at issue in the preceding arguments is not whether VAT mechanisms deploy 
sufficient information so as to always identify places of consumption.137 It is instead whether basic VAT 
mechanisms deploy any identifying information regarding places of consumption. If they do not, DCFT 
proponents have yet to offer a single example of a mechanism that links a specific instance of corporate 
production with ultimate consumer purchases in another country.     
This is not to deny that governments and specialists in VAT design have been working to develop 
rules and administrative practices that would more successfully tax cross-border B2C transactions 
(whether on a destination or origin basis).138 Such rules and practices will likely incorporate more 
information regarding the place of final consumption than do traditional VAT rules. It is no exaggeration, 
however, to say that such relatively recent efforts pale in comparison with the massive resources that 
governments and taxpayers have for half a century poured into, and continue to pour into, developing 
rules and administrative infrastructures for residence-based income taxation of individuals. I have in mind 
here U.S. controlled foreign corporation (CFC) and PFIC rules, and their counterparts in Canada, 
Australia, Germany, France, and other countries,139 as well as more recent efforts by governments to 
collect information regarding offshore accounts that require disclosure of beneficial ownership that look 
through corporations. That is, real world income tax systems already deploy a lot of information 
regarding, for given individuals, what foreign corporations own, and for given corporations, what foreign 
shareholders they have. Such information is also widely deployed in financial regulations outside the 
income tax. In the final Part of this Article, I explain why this may not be accidental, and why it has a 
surprising implication for reforming international corporate taxation. 
VI. The Information Superiority of Residence-Based Taxation  
 
By its nature, the VAT applies only to the supply of goods and services. Simple reflection 
suggests that the sale and purchase of goods and services generally transpire in such a way that parties 
need not know the identities of their counterparties, or any case do not retain information about such 
                                                     
135 Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen & Peter K. Schott, Importers, Exporters, and Multinationals: A Portrait 
of Firms in the U.S. that Trade Goods, in PRODUCER DYNAMICS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA 513 (Timothy 
Dunne et al. eds, 2009). 
136 Id. at 534. 
137 DCT proponents are clear that they do not intend to rely exclusively on VAT rules to determine the “destinations” 
by reference to which corporate profits are taxed. Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 9. 
138 For the work of OECD Working Party No. 9, see Keen & Hellerstein, supra note 90, at 373-382; for references to 
other recent European developments, see Devereux & de la Feria, supra note 3, at 19-20.  
139 See HUGH AULT & BRIAN ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (2010), Part 
Four, Subpart A, Section 4.  
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identities.140 The identities of transacting parties are relevant only when such transactions implicate 
particular types of legal relationships, e.g. the relationship of agency. If any information is retained (think 
of the simple store receipt), it tends to be information about the seller kept by the buyer, not the other way 
around. In contrast, it seems that by their nature, the establishment of financial claims—including debtor-
creditor relationships and equity ownerships—generally requires the knowledge of mutual identities. 
Parties that have financial claims against one another generally do not remain anonymous. Where they do, 
they are connected through a chain of non-anonymous agency relationships.141  
I am not aware of any general legal theory either identifying or explaining the tendency towards 
anonymity displayed by transactions in goods and services, even though that tendency seems to be 
recognized, for example, in the view that any commodity tax cannot hope to be progressive, because the 
sellers collecting such a tax would not be able to keep track of who the purchasers are and what tax 
brackets they are in.142 It is possible, however, that no deep theory is needed. The difference, in respect of 
the maintenance of identity (or anonymity) of transacting parties, between non-financial transactions and 
transactions establishing financial claims143 could lie in the simple fact that financial claims by definition 
persist over time. Therefore the parties need the identities of their counterparties to locate them later on.144 
Similarly, transactions in goods and services require the keeping of identities only insofar as they create 
claims over time (e.g. warranty for defective products). 
If the foregoing reasoning is as sound as it appears, then it becomes obvious why the VAT 
transmits no information about final consumers. Even sellers making sales to final consumers directly in 
person generally will know very little about their customers—whether they are buying for final 
consumption, where they reside, or any number of other characteristics. Ipso facto, such information 
cannot be transmitted by the sellers to upstream sellers. The difficulty of envisioning tracing intermediate 
sales to final consumption (posed as the second horn of the dilemma for DCFT Version 1 in Part II.1 
supra) has its fundamental root here. This is not to say that governments cannot require sellers to obtain 
information about buyers (as they do for the sale of firearms), or that sellers cannot conduct market 
surveys about who their customers are. It is only to say that obtaining information about customers either 
individually or collectively is, most of the time, not an intrinsic part of, but an addition to, transactions in 
goods and services. Such information gathering, therefore, introduces costs that are not originally present 
on market activities.   
By contrast, share ownership is a type of financial claim, and therefore the basic market 
conditions for the transmission of mutual identities (either from corporations to shareholders or from 
                                                     
140 For present purposes, the only relevant aspects of the identities of transacting parties are whether purchasers are 
individuals and where they reside. The latter information is, of course, subject to the ambiguity of the notion of 
residence. Such ambiguity, however, is not relevant in comparing the relative merits of destination-based and 
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141 For a recent discussion in the tax literature of such relationships, see Reid Thompson & David Weisbach, 
Attributes of Ownership, 67 TAX L. REV. 249 (2014). 
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exact withholding on wage payments. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, RETURN-FREE TAX SYSTEMS: TAX 
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shareholders to corporations) are always present, regardless of whether governments impose any 
requirement to gather such information. All that the government has to do in tax and financial regulations 
is to harness such information. It may be that a regulatory regime at a given point in time does not harness 
such information. For example, Chris Sanchirico has argued that under current U.S. securities law and 
regulations, not much is known about the nationalities of the owners of the shares of listed companies 
(including those that are purportedly “American”).145 This is an interesting fact to establish, but ultimately 
it seems to be just a contingent fact that happens to characterize a changing regulatory system  at the 
present time. There is little dispute that a listed company is connected to its ultimate shareholders through 
a chain of non-anonymous relationships.146 Some parties in the chain may have incentives not to transmit 
the information they possess to the government or other parties: harnessing the information is a matter of 
changing such incentives. But it is not about making market participants collect information that they 
would not otherwise have any use for. 
If this is correct, then the most fundamental conceptual question for DCFT proposals is whether 
corporate profits should be taxed by reference to information embodied in financial claims or information 
pertaining to the sales of goods and services. The residence of shareholders is an example of the former. 
The location of consumers (“destination”) is an example of the latter. Since individuals’ residence and 
their place of consumption largely overlap, the choice between residence and “destination” essentially 
boils down to which is the most effective channel of transmitting the same information. The foregoing 
discussion implies that the by far more plausible answer is residence, not “destination”. Evidence from 
real world tax systems is perfectly consistent with this assessment: on the one hand, the VAT (which is 
typically “destination-based”, but in a different and irrelevant sense) relies little on information about the 
location of final consumers; on the other hand, income tax systems designed to prevent the deferral or 
evasion of obligations to report foreign income try precisely to connect assets and income with their 
claimants. 
Why, then, has individual-residence-based taxation generally been assumed to be infeasible in 
recent corporate tax reform proposals, whereas proposals for destination-based taxation is able to 
command interest and attention? One possible explanation is the following. Taxing corporate profit by 
reference to residence can be understood in two different ways. The first, more traditional understanding 
is to tax individual shareholders on income earned through (domestic and foreign) corporations.147 To do 
so, the government must possess two kinds of information: first, where (i.e. in which foreign countries) 
the individual shareholder has assets and income; and second, how much income the individual has from 
each source. The first type of information pertains to the identities of parties involved in chains of 
financial claims (and agency relationships). Therefore gathering it is, as argued above, a matter of the 
government harnessing information the market already has (though possibly against the resistance of tax 
evaders and third parties willing to assist such evaders for a profit). The second type of information 
pertains to the substance of the financial claims themselves, and not just the identity of the transacting 
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(2015). 
146 Thompson and Weisbach, supra note 141. 
147 Note that the basic assumption of this understanding is that individuals should be taxed on an accrual basis under 
an income tax. Taxing individuals when they receive dividend distributions from foreign corporations would raise 
no difficulty of implementation. 
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parties. The purported impracticality of taxing individual shareholders on a residence basis has had to do 
as much with the second type of information as the first. For example, the U.S. has three alternative 
regimes for shareholder taxation of investments in PFICs: the mark-to-market method, the flow through 
method, and deferral with interest.  The first method can be applied only for publicly traded entities. The 
second requires the supply of financial information by foreign corporations to U.S. shareholders, which is 
not always practical.148 The third approach applies where the first two approaches fail,149 but may itself be 
open to other objections.150 The challenges relating to the gathering of this second type of information 
have not dissuaded all from residence-based shareholder taxation, 151 but they seem to have done so to 
many.152  
But there is an alternative way of understanding the notion of taxing corporate profit by reference 
to residence. On this second understanding, corporations are the taxpayers, and how their income or profit 
is taxed should depend on the residence of the corporations’ ultimate shareholders. If corporate income or 
profits can be taxed in this way, then the neutrality criteria that motivate the DCFT can be satisfied. For 
such taxation to be feasible, only information about the identities—or, even more narrowly, the tax 
residence—of the shareholders is needed. There is no need to apportion income or profits to individual 
shareholders. For this approach to work, in other words, only the first of the two types of information that 
the traditional approach of residence-based individual taxation relies on is needed. Presumably, its 
feasibility is correspondingly greater than the traditional approach. 
What has just been described is a form of formulary apportionment that taxes corporate income or 
profit according to where the corporation’s ultimate shareholders reside. This policy option has received 
almost no discussion in the international tax literature,153 but it follows directly from the intuitions of 
DCFT proponents. Figure 2 illustrates how. For any multinational company X, two sets of facts can be 
viewed as fixed: (1) who the ultimate suppliers of its equity capital are, and in particular, in which country 
they reside; (2) who the ultimate consumers are that purchase the goods and services that X contributes to 
producing, and, again, where they reside in particular. If X’s profit can be taxed by reference to either set 
of facts, then the problems created by the combination of source-based taxation and capital mobility go 
away. DCFT proposals suggest the use of the second set of facts. However, tracing the sales of X to the 
places of final consumption is, for basic and simple reasons discussed above, infeasible.154 By contrast, 
tracing X’s profits to the place of ultimate shareholding is fundamentally feasible. Therefore, many of the 
                                                     
148 Kleinbard, supra note 38,  claims that the superiority of his BEIT proposal lies in part in avoiding such 
impracticality. 
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154 The VAT-like mechanisms of DCFT Versions 2 and 3 eschew such tracing, but only at the expense of not 
transferring any revenue to country D from X’s profits. Moreover, the failure of such tracing can result in creating 
similar distortions as source-based taxation.  
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main arguments in favor of DCFT proposals should point to the consideration of formulary 







Evaluating the merits and implementability of the idea of taxing corporate profits by residence-
based formulary apportionment is beyond the scope of this Article. There are substantive reasons for not 
rushing into such an exercise. As the examination of DCFT proposals in this Article has shown, present 
academic discussions of reforming international corporate taxation are characterized by certain 
fundamental disagreements, or at least diverging assumptions that theorists have not tried to reconcile. 
Some of these diverging assumption concern normative criteria. For example, should the design of 
international taxation try only to attain production efficiency, or should one adopt a more comprehensive 
normative framework, such as the optimal tax framework routinely applied in discussions of domestic tax 
policy? To what extent, and how, should the desire for progressivity (within individual national tax 
systems) be taken into account?  Should trade-offs between efficiency and distributional objectives be 
allowed?155 Beyond uncertainty about the appropriate normative criteria, divergent assumptions about the 
incentives of countries are also often made. Is it feasible for countries to transfer revenue among 
themselves, and under what conditions? Is it feasible for countries to provide mutual administrative 
assistance in tax collection, and again, under what conditions? When do countries cooperate and when do 
they act purely strategically?  
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Perhaps surprisingly for what is so far only a set of theoretical proposals, the various versions of 
the DCFT have not been consistent with respect to the foregoing normative issues and behavioral 
assumptions. Production efficiency, progressivity, and possibly revenue distribution among countries all 
seem to matter somewhat, but there is no general normative framework into which all these 
considerations fit. Some versions of the DCFT (i.e. Versions 1 and 3) require mutual administrative 
assistance; some require revenue transfers (i.e. Version 3); and even for the version (i.e. Version 2) that 
does not require either, it is not yet clear whether some degree of cooperation (e.g. jointly-agreed 
adoption of the tax) among nations is necessary for the efficiency properties of the tax to be assured. 
Moreover, the relationship of the tax to shareholder-level taxation is left unclear; one can only conjecture 
what is implicitly assumed (most likely, corporate taxation is simply a sui generis source of revenue and 
bears no direct conceptual relation to the personal income tax). Finally, strong empirical assumptions are 
made about the incidence of the DCFT to ensure that it does not give rise to one set of inefficiencies while 
trying to eliminate another.   
It should be stressed, however, that these are not the central objections made against DCFT 
proposals in this Article. Instead, the central objections are the (i) implementation dilemma described in 
Part II.1 for DCFT Version 1, (ii) the dilemma outlined in Part III.2-3 for DCFT Versions 2 and 3, and (iii) 
the more general critique of the idea of taxing corporate profit by reference to consumer location 
elaborated in Parts V-VI. These objections, I believe, are arguments against the DCFT in its own terms. 
The uncertainties about the appropriate normative framework and behavioral assumptions for evaluating 
international tax regimes, by contrast, arguably characterize all existing academic analysis of international 
taxation. They diminish the potential of any proposal for reforming the international tax system to guide 
real world action. Ironically, the outcomes of the OECD’s BEPS project may end up helping theorists to 
calibrate their behavioral assumptions and the weight they assign to various normative goals, thereby 
enhancing the likelihood of theory to provide guidance to policy and action in the future.  
 
 
